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Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws 
Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to determine which type of antitrust 
enforcement deters more anticompetitive behavior: the U.S. Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division’s criminal anti-cartel enforcement 
program or private enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. The answer to this 
question—and answers to related questions concerning deterrence and 
compensation issues—could have important implications for the United 
States, pertaining both to appropriate antitrust remedies and to the course 
of litigation of private antitrust cases. Those answers also could influence 
other nations considering either adopting or changing criminal penalties 
for competition law violations, or allowing private rights of action by the 
victims of competition law violations. 
Anti-cartel enforcement by the DOJ long has been the gold standard 
of antitrust enforcement worldwide. If a country were to have only one 
type of antitrust violation, surely it would be against horizontal cartels, 
and surely this law would be enforced by that country’s government 
officials. Even critics who believe that monopolization and vertical 
restraints never or rarely should be challenged almost always believe in 
 
  The authors are, respectively, Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School 
of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust Institute; Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, 
Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of 
Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute. This Article in part 
relies upon and significantly extends analysis contained in the authors’ earlier joint work, Benefits 
From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661 (last revised April 27, 2010). For 
summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. 
Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523 (last revised Oct. 15, 2008). The 
authors are grateful to the American Antitrust Institute for funding the empirical portions of this 
study, to participants in conferences sponsored by the American Antitrust Institute, George 
Washington University, and the Lear Conference, and to Albert A. Foer, John M. Connor, and John 
R. Woodbury for comments and suggestions, and to Thomas Appel, Kathi Black, Christine Carey, 
Joanna Diamond, Ken Fung, Gary Stapleton, Thomas Weaver, and Michael Cannon for valuable 
research assistance. 
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strong anti-cartel enforcement.1
 
People in the antitrust world disagree 
about many things, but it is extremely difficult to find responsible critics 
who do not applaud the U.S. government’s anti-cartel program.2 We 
strongly agree with this almost-unanimous consensus and are second to 
no one in our appreciation of the DOJ’s anti-cartel activity. In terms of 
taxpayer dollars well spent, the program surely is one of the most 
outstanding in all of government. 
By contrast, private antitrust enforcement under U.S. antitrust laws 
gets little respect and much criticism. Indeed, it is difficult to find many 
people other than members of the plaintiffs’ bar willing to say much 
good about private enforcement. For example, even moderates like FTC 
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch believe that treble damage class action 
cases “are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are 
generally at issue . . . . The plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . stand to win almost 
regardless of the merits of the case.”3 Due to these widespread beliefs, 
former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic recently summarized the 
 
 1. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66–67 
(2d ed. 1993); see also id. at 263 (“The law’s oldest and, properly qualified, most valuable rule states 
that it is illegal per se for competitors to agree to limit rivalry among themselves. . . . Its 
contributions to consumer welfare over the decades have been enormous.”); id. at 163–97 (Bork’s 
analysis of monopolization and attempted monopolization); id. at 225–45 (Bork’s analysis regarding 
conglomerate mergers); id. at 280–98 (Bork’s analysis regarding price maintenance); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 Antitrust L.J. 95 (1986). 
 2. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have made anti-cartel activity their 
highest priority. Both have succeeded wonderfully at this crucial task and for this they have been 
applauded widely. It is difficult to find many who have even questioned the DOJ’s anti-cartel 
enforcement, except for small criticisms at the margins. If we may use the terms of professors, it is 
possible to find critics who give the DOJ anti-cartel programs an “A” instead of an “A+,” but almost 
impossible to find responsible critics grading them lower than this. See AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION 
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2008), 
available at http:// www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/11001 (describing “the resilience of antitrust”). 
By contrast, it is easy to find critics on both sides of the political aisle giving much lower grades, 
even failing grades, to other DOJ antitrust programs. For example, the AAI’s report sharply 
criticized the DOJ’s record in the Section 2 area. See id. at 55, 58–59. 
 3.  J. Thomas Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, Remarks to the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission 9–10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ rosch/Rosch-
AMC%20Remarks.June8.final.pdf. Similarly, Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal & Manges’ 
Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform, and replied: “[c]lass 
actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs’ law firms and not to consumers.” Q&A 
with Weil Gotshal’s Steven A. Newborn, LAW360 (June 1, 2009), 
http://law360.com/competition/articles/103359. 
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conventional wisdom about private enforcement succinctly: “private 
rights of actions U.S. style are poison.”4 
Given these criticisms, it may come as a surprise—even a shock—
that a quantitative analysis of the facts demonstrates that private antitrust 
enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than the 
DOJ’s anti-cartel program.5 This deterrence effect is, of course, in 
addition to its virtually unique compensation function.6 If this article’s 
conclusion about the importance of private enforcement for deterrence is 
true, private antitrust enforcement also should receive much of the praise 
given to DOJ anti-cartel efforts. Further, private enforcement should be 
encouraged in the United States rather than hampered through new 
legislation7 or through restrictive judicial interpretation of existing law.8 
And the United States’ version of private antitrust enforcement should be 
something for other countries to consider.9 
 
 4. FTC: WATCH No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007, at 4 (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking at an 
ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where he summarized the conventional wisdom in the 
field but was not necessarily agreeing with it). For additional criticisms of private antitrust 
enforcement, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 883–89. 
 5. We will not, however, attempt to compare private enforcement to FTC enforcement 
because, except for a few disgorgement cases, the FTC obtains only injunctive relief.  
 6. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 881–83; Harry First, Lost in Conversation: 
The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law (2009) (unpublished draft) (on file with author). 
Another goal of private enforcement is to restore competition to markets. See Lande & Davis, 
Benefits, supra note *, at 881. 
 7. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified 
throughout 28 U.S.C.). The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows defendants to remove most 
class actions to federal court and, as a result, arguably makes class certification for state law claims 
more difficult. Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530–31 (noting one goal of CAFA was to make class 
certification more difficult for plaintiffs). 
 8. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (overruling Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41 (1957), and applying heightened pleading standard to private antitrust cases). 
 9. In a thoughtful critique of this Article, John R. Woodbury suggests the possibility that 
private enforcement, even if more effective as a deterrent than DOJ criminal enforcement—indeed, 
particularly under those circumstances—may lead to over-deterrence. See John R. Woodbury, Paper 
Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 3–4 (August 2010), 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/10/08/Aug10-pTrail8-2f.pdf. He rests this possibility in 
part on the reputational effects of litigation, offering as an “admittedly extreme example” BP’s 
willingness to provide $20 billion in compensation for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Id. The 
choice of this example may be telling. There is little indication that antitrust defendants in private 
litigation suffer any significant cost in terms of their reputation, and so it is perhaps no accident that 
Woodbury did not offer a more directly relevant example to make his point. More generally, 
however, in this Article we do not attempt to determine whether antitrust violations on the whole are 
insufficiently or excessively deterred. Our aim is to establish a proposition that is more limited, 
although one that still defies conventional wisdom: that private enforcement probably serves as a 
greater deterrent to antitrust violations than criminal enforcement by the DOJ. A demonstration that 
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Part II of this Article analyzes the deterrence effects of DOJ anti-
cartel efforts by studying DOJ cases filed from 1990 to 2007. Part III 
compares these results to the cumulative deterrence effects of a sample 
of forty large private cases that ended during this same period. (We do 
not compare the DOJ with the deterrence effects of every private case 
filed during this period, however, because we were unable to obtain this 
information).  
Before coming to any policy conclusions based on this comparison, 
we address some criticisms of private enforcement. Few commentators 
dispute that most DOJ anti-cartel prosecutions involved anticompetitive 
conduct or that most DOJ cartel cases should have been brought. But are 
most private enforcement cases legitimate? Do most involve 
anticompetitive behavior? Considering the widespread criticism within 
the profession of private enforcement, and that most successful private 
cases result only in settlements, do these cases mostly involve underlying 
anticompetitive conduct? We address this topic in Part IV, concluding 
that the evidence suggests the legal actions on which we rely did indeed 
entail claims with merit. Part V then acknowledges some qualifications 
and caveats to the quantitative conclusions of this Article.  
Finally, Part VI concludes by offering policy suggestions that follow 
from our analysis. Our results demonstrate that private enforcement most 
certainly has crucial deterrence effects. These effects are so important 
that U.S. courts should not continue their steps to curtail private 
enforcement, and foreign jurisdictions should consider permitting private 
enforcement of competition laws as a complement to government efforts.  
II. DETERRENCE FROM DOJ ANTI-CARTEL CASES 
The DOJ Antitrust Division can attempt to deter illegal cartel activity 
in several ways. First, it can request that courts fine the corporations 
involved. Second, it can request that the most culpable individuals be 
fined. Third, it can and occasionally does ask for restitution. Fourth, it 
can request that some of the individuals involved be imprisoned or 
placed under house arrest.10 The Division also can secure injunctions to 
restore competition to the affected markets. Since we know of no way to 
 
private enforcement helps the law to more closely approximate optimal deterrence is a project for 
another day.  
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1999–2008, 13 
n.14, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/242359.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) (The term other 
confinement “[i]ncludes house arrest or confinement to a halfway house or community treatment 
center.”).  
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value these injunctions, however, or to compare them to injunctions 
secured by private parties, we have omitted them from our analysis.11 
A. Optimal Deterrence of Cartels 
The most generally accepted approach to optimally deterring 
antitrust violations was developed by Professor William Landes,12
 
who 
convincingly showed that to achieve optimal13 deterrence,14 the total 
amount of the sanctions imposed against an antitrust violator should be 
equal to the violation’s expected “net harm to others,” divided by the 
probability of detection and proof of the violation.15 Moreover, because 
 
 11. Additionally, DOJ cases often set important legal precedents that can deter 
anticompetitive conduct significantly. We do not know how to value these precedents, however, or 
to compare their value to the value of precedents established through private enforcement. For an 
excellent analysis of this topic, see Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise Criminal Antitrust 
Enforcement, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (June 2006), 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2006(pdf)/200610-COMPedCalkins. pdf. Calkins 
found that of leading antitrust cases decided before 1977, twelve were private and twenty-seven 
were government. Of the leading cases decided in 1977 or later, however, he found thirty private 
cases and only fifteen government cases. Id. at 12, 14 (sample taken from the leading cases printed 
in the leading antitrust casebook). Calkins concluded:  
Today what is known as U.S. antitrust law no longer is exclusively or even principally 
the consequence of Justice Department [or FTC or State] enforcement. The leading 
modern cases on monopolization, attempted monopolization, joint ventures, proof of 
agreement; boycott; other horizontal restraints of trade, resale price maintenance, 
territorial restraints, vertical boycott claims, tying, price discrimination, jurisdiction, and 
exemptions are almost all the result of litigation brought by someone other than the 
Justice Department [or the FTC or the States].  
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).  
 12. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 
(1983). Landes built upon concepts developed in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), by applying them to the antitrust field.  
 13. The goal is optimal deterrence, not complete deterrence, because enforcement aggressive 
enough to deter all cartels is likely to unduly penalize honest business conduct. Therefore a proper 
balance must be struck to achieve optimal deterrence.  
 14. Professor Landes was not concerned with compensating victims. For an analysis that 
takes victim compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages 
Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 161–68 (1993), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134822. 
 15. See Landes, supra note 12, at 657. If the harm was ten and the probability of detection 
and proof .333, since (10/.333 = 30), the optimal penalty for this violation would be 30. This ignores 
risk aversion and other factors. See id. Analysts of both the Chicago and post-Chicago schools of 
antitrust have almost universally accepted these principles. See Lande, supra note 14, at 125–26. 
Despite the general acknowledgement of the superiority of the Landes approach, however, many 
respected scholars and enforcers instead focus upon the gain to the lawbreaker, perhaps because it is 
simpler to calculate. For an insightful analysis, see Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: 
Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 183, 190–93 (2006).  
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not every cartel is detected or successfully sanctioned, the “net harm to 
others” from cartels should be multiplied by a number that is larger than 
one (the multiplier should be the inverse of the probability of detection 
and proof).16 In other words, the optimal penalty = (harms) ÷ 
(probability of detection x probability of proof). 
In applying Landes’s model, we will undertake several important 
steps that warrant noting. First, we will attempt to compare financial 
penalties imposed on corporations with similar penalties imposed on the 
individual corporate actors who are personally responsible for an 
antitrust violation. Second, we will attempt to compare financial 
penalties with time in prison (or time spent under house arrest).  
Of course, making these comparisons in an objective, accurate, and 
non-controversial manner is not possible. The conventional wisdom 
seems to be that fines are superior to prison as a way to secure optimal 
deterrence.17 However, one might argue, to put the points in their 
strongest form, that corporate actors care only about their own financial 
well-being and that prison sentences are so abhorrent18 that no corporate 
 
 16. Unfortunately, this is often difficult to determine: 
Of course, no one knows the percentage of cartels that are detected and proven. In 1986, 
the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg (AAG Ginsburg), 
estimated that the enforcers detected no more than 10% of all cartels. There are reasons to 
believe that the Antitrust Division’s amnesty program has resulted in a larger percentage 
of cartels detected and proven today, but there is anecdotal evidence that, despite the 
enforcers’ superb efforts, many cartels still operate. From an optimal deterrence 
perspective it would be necessary to know the percentage of cartels that are detected and 
proven to know what number to multiply the “net harms to others” by. At a minimum, 
however, we know that if the combined antitrust sanctions only total the actual damages, 
firms would be significantly undeterred from committing antitrust violations.  
Ideally, optimal deterrence should be based upon the expectations of potential price 
fixers, not the results of their price-fixing or the actual fines imposed. To ascertain this, 
however, we would have to interview a random sample of potential price fixers and 
discern their expectations. In reality, however, it would be impossible to assemble a 
proper random sample or to get them to respond candidly. 
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal 
Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 519–20 (2005) (citations omitted).  
 17. The conventional wisdom in the field was well summarized by V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“Thus, 
some justification for corporate criminal liability may have existed in the past, when civil 
enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little now 
supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.”). 
 18. See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 
EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 31 (2009); Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The Paper Label 
Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (1977) (“Experience supports the conclusion that 
businessmen view prison as uniquely unpleasant and that therefore incarceration is a uniquely 
effective deterrent.”); Arthur L. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630, 
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actor would be willing to risk prison, no matter how large the financial 
gain (or, to put the point somewhat differently, that a corporate actor 
would be willing to pay virtually any amount of money to avoid the risk 
of prison).19  
The extreme form of these arguments is unpersuasive. Corporate 
actors do in fact risk their own prison time for the financial benefit of 
their employers when they violate the antitrust laws—by, for example, 
participating in price fixing. Moreover, the literature on antitrust law 
generally assumes that corporations maximize profits, which means that 
it also assumes the interests of corporate representatives and corporations 
generally align.20 Any other approach would greatly complicate antitrust 
 
630–31 (1977) (“To the businessman . . . prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis 
breaks down when the risk is jail.”). 
 19. Baker & Reeves, supra note 18, at 621–22. Note the important difference in these two 
baselines: a corporate actor might demand a different sum to risk prison than they would be willing 
to pay to avoid the risk of prison. For example, suppose someone would rather pay a $2 million fine 
than be imprisoned for one year. How would that person react to the question of whether they would 
accept $2 million in return to going to prison for one year? They might not agree to this deal. Part of 
the difference is the relative wealth of the actor in the two situations. A corporate actor can demand 
an unlimited amount to accept the risk of prison. And any such payment increases his or her wealth. 
But the same person cannot pay an unlimited amount to avoid the risk of prison. She can only spend 
as much money as she has or can borrow. See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and 
Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 424, 428 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). But there is another element at play here as well. 
Empirical evidence shows that people’s attitudes toward costs and benefits depend on their 
perception of the status quo. Id. at 428–29. A person who accepts prison as the status quo may be 
willing to pay less to avoid it than a person who sees prison as a deviation from the status quo. A 
corollary is that, depending on the odds and stakes, people value avoiding losses—and are willing to 
take risks to do so—far more than they value gains—which they generally will not take risks to 
obtain (although, oddly, this principle may vary depending on the odds of the risk and the size of the 
gain or loss). See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 35–36 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000). This psychological phenomenon—and others—greatly complicates an economic analysis of 
behavior. So, for example, a corporate actor who perceives herself as taking steps that violate the 
antitrust law to return to the status quo (perhaps because she thinks her corporation is suffering from 
unfair competition) may be far more tolerant of risk than the same corporate actor who contemplates 
the same measure as a means of obtaining a perceived economic advantage. Even for a single 
corporate actor, then, there may be no single correct amount that represents her willingness to trade 
off between gain for her corporation and the risk of prison for herself.  
 20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter, POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW] (arguing that his brand of economic analysis of antitrust law has come to 
predominate judicial doctrine, with a consensus that “business firms should be assumed to be 
rational profit maximizers, so that the issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular 
business practice should be whether it is a means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase 
its profits at the expense of efficiency”). See also Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-
Collar Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 417–18 & n.27 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Optimal 
Sentences] (acknowledging that he has made “an argument . . . in the antitrust context for confining 
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analysis, requiring an inquiry not only into the market and its participants 
but also into the internal workings of particular corporations. Indeed, 
there is an odd—and usually unexplained—inconsistency when 
proponents of the free market claim that corporations should not be 
subject to civil liability for the wrongdoing of their representatives: if the 
free market works in the sense that corporations respond in an efficient 
manner to market incentives, including by encouraging corporate 
representatives to act for the benefit of the corporation, why shouldn’t 
the same be true of legal sanctions?21 
The work of Richard Posner provides a useful illustration. He 
addresses—and rejects—the twin concerns about correlating financial 
penalties to corporations with prison terms for corporate representatives: 
(1) that corporate representatives have different interests than 
corporations and (2) that prison time cannot be equated with a monetary 
sum. The first issue involves a potential divergence of interests between 
principal and agent, which economists tend to call agency costs. Posner’s 
response:  
A corporation has effective methods of preventing its employees from 
committing acts that impose huge [antitrust] liabilities on it. A sales 
manager whose unauthorized participation in a paltry price-fixing 
scheme resulted in the imposition of a $1 million fine on his employer 
would thereafter, I predict, have great difficulty finding responsible 
employment, and this prospect should be sufficient to deter.22 
In other words, corporations can and will impose incentives that align 
their interests and the interests of their representatives. 
 
criminal (or civil-penalty) liability to the corporation, on the theory that if it is liable it will find 
adequate ways of imposing on its employees the costs to it of violating the law”) (citing RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225–26 (1976)). The same is true for 
scholars of a similar ilk in the field of securities. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1996) (“Managers may do their best to take 
advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they 
had investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Sentencing the Corporation, 71 B.U. L. REV. 383, 385 
(1991) (“While it is true that managers have a hard time getting the rank and file to adapt to market 
threats, no one suggests that corporations are so hidebound or so buffered from their capital 
environments that market penalties must be ruinously high before the company will respond. Why 
should it be otherwise with legal penalties?”). 
 22. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 20, at 271. But see John Collins Coffee, Jr., 
Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 458–59 (1980) (noting examples of limited internal sanctions imposed 
against individuals responsible for antitrust violations).  
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Posner has also addressed the second issue—the concern that prison 
time cannot be correlated to financial penalties. He has argued for “the 
substitution, whenever possible, of the fine (or civil penalty) for the 
prison sentence as the punishment for crime.”23 His contention is, 
particularly in cases of “white collar” crime,24 that “fining the affluent 
offender is preferable to imprisoning him from society’s standpoint 
because it is less costly and no less efficacious.”25 As he notes, “The fine 
[or civil liability] for a white-collar crime can be set at whatever level 
imposes the same disutility on the defendant, and thus yield the same 
deterrence, as the prison sentence that would have been imposed 
instead.”26 
Thus skeptics of private enforcement with a Chicago school 
orientation—including Posner himself27—should not rely on agency 
costs or the inherent superiority of prison as a deterrent to reject an effort 
to compare the deterrence effects of private enforcement and criminal 
prosecutions.28  
 
 23. Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 409. 
 24. Id. at 409–10 (defining “white collar” crime).  
 25. Id. at 410.  
 26. Id. Posner is familiar with resistance to this claim—indeed, his article responds in part to 
a sophisticated criticism by John Coffee that contends that “the threat of imprisonment is inherently 
greater than that of a fine,” id. at 413 (citing Coffee, supra note 22), or, presumably, civil liability. 
Posner usefully distills Coffee’s argument to three points: (1) financial penalties work only if the 
culpable party has the means to pay them; (2) fines themselves work only if backed by a sufficient 
penalty for non-payment (otherwise they will not be paid); and (3) culpable parties are likely to 
experience an increasing marginal loss of utility as fines get larger (at least up until the point that 
they have no money left), but a decreasing marginal loss of utility as prison sentences grow in 
length. Id. at 413–14. The first two points have only limited significance for our Article: 
corporations generally can pay the damages they owe and courts have methods of making them do 
so, including mulcting them with sanctions for contempt. But Coffee’s point about the potentially 
complicated relationship between financial penalties and prison time does suggest that any ratio 
between prison time and money will be an imperfect approximation. 
 27. See, e.g., POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 20, at 274–75. Posner’s concern about 
antitrust class actions is particularly curious. He levels two criticisms: first, that class action lawyers 
have incentive to settle cases for relatively small amounts compared to their actual worth and, 
second, that risk-averse corporations may settle claims for too much because of an unlikely 
possibility of an extraordinarily large loss. Id. at 275. Posner does not address the fact that these 
tendencies—if real—are off-setting.  
 28. Indeed, Posner even suggests what he believes to be a feasible method for estimating the 
trade-off between years in prison and monetary sanctions: 
[A] promising method would be to infer statistically the relative deterrent effect of fine 
and prison. Suppose that in one federal district the average fine for a federal white-collar 
offense is $1,000 and the average prison term 30 days, and in another district it is $800 
and 40 days, and so forth. Then, by comparing the incidence of the offenses across 
districts, we should be able to infer the rate of exchange at which days in jail translate 
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More plausible points are that a financial penalty against an 
individual has more of an impact than a similar penalty against a 
corporation and that one year of prison time is equivalent to a relatively 
large financial penalty. We make accommodations for these plausible 
assumptions in our analysis infra by tripling the disvalue or deterrence 
effects of individual sanctions relative to corporate sanctions.29  
Perhaps optimal deterrence can only be secured by a mix of 
corporate and individual sanctions. If only corporations were subject to 
penalties, individuals might be unduly tempted to form cartels if, as has 
been suggested by some research,30 they did not face significant internal 
sanctions for their illegal behavior31 or an appropriate diminution of their 
 
into dollars of fine with no loss of deterrence. (A study of state white-collar prosecutions, 
conducted along similar lines, might also be feasible.) Since no such study has been 
attempted, I cannot evaluate the difficulties it might encounter arising, for example, 
because the incidence of many white-collar crimes (e.g., price-fixing conspiracies) is 
unknown, or the gravity of the crime may vary across districts or states, which affects the 
optimal sentence. Such a study might not produce results entitled to great confidence. 
Nevertheless, supplemented by the intuition that guides judges today in devising fine-
prison “packages” to impose on white collar offenders, such a study should provide a 
close enough approximation of the actual fine-prison trade-off that we need not fear that 
by substituting fines for prison sentences in white-collar cases we would be drastically 
altering the expected punishment cost, and hence the level, of white-collar crime. 
Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 413. We know of no study along these lines. And, of 
course, the analysis assumes that compliance with antitrust law depends primarily, perhaps even 
exclusively, on the incentives created by money or prison. Cf. Stone, supra note 21, at 389 (arguing 
that the “moral responsibility” to obey the law explains the compliance of many corporate actors). 
 29. We readily acknowledge that our decision to triple the deterrence effects of the individual 
penalties relative to corporate penalties was arbitrary.  
  A critic of private enforcement could argue that even a very large amount of money paid 
by the corporation is meaningless from a deterrence perspective—that managers could care less how 
much money their corporations pay. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to 
Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 
393 (1981). They could argue that only individual fines and prison matter at all from a deterrence 
perspective, so private enforcement does not deter anything. Of course, this view contradicts the 
basic assumption that corporations are profit maximizers. Surely corporations do not like paying 
millions or billions of dollars, so there must be some deterrence from private cases. Moreover, the 
individuals responsible for this liability are likely to have their careers detrimentally affected when 
their actions require their corporation to pay large sums in private cases. See POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW, supra note 20, at 271 (arguing that causing a corporation to suffer financial losses will harm 
careers of employees); cf. Coffee, supra note 22, at 458–59 (providing examples of corporate 
representatives violating the law to the detriment of the corporation but not suffering adverse 
consequences). For these reasons, while correlating financial penalties to corporations with prison 
time to corporate representatives is tricky, it seems to overstate the case to suggest there is no 
correlation whatsoever.  
 30. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 458–59. 
 31. Greg Werden suggests additional reasons: “This can occur as a result of defects in the 
design of compensation schemes, especially if the executives have short time horizons or are more 
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future income. On the other hand, if only individual penalties existed, it 
could be in the interests of some corporations to establish internal 
incentives that failed to discourage, rewarded, or even coerced 
employees into engaging in illegal behavior.32 Some corporations might 
prefer to offer up a few executives for multi-year prison terms rather than 
pay $100 million or more in a criminal fine or payout in private 
litigation.33 In light of these complexities, this Article will use a total 
deterrence approach and will determine the sum of individual and 
corporate deterrence. As noted earlier, our analysis will make 
accommodations for these complexities and agency-principal problems 
by tripling the disvalue or deterrence effects of individual sanctions 
relative to corporate sanctions. With these qualifications in place, we can 
begin our analysis by addressing the deterrence effect of the DOJ’s 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.  
B. Deterrence from DOJ Cartel Fines and Restitution 
The Antitrust Division has successfully prosecuted hundreds of 
cartels. While it is of course impossible to determine how many cartels 
were never formed due to the prospect of penalties resulting from 
investigations (i.e., how much deterrence the Antitrust Division’s cases 
were responsible for), surely it is significant. We are of course unable to 
quantify the actual deterrence from the DOJ’s efforts. We can, however, 
quantify various DOJ remedies—corporate fines, individual fines, 
restitution, and imprisonment—out of our belief that on average the 
corporations and individuals involved will tend to respond rationally to 
these sanctions, and that heavy sanctions will tend to discourage cartel 
formation.  
 
willing than business enterprises to take risks. Consequently, business enterprises can incur 
substantial costs in monitoring their executives and complying with the law.” See Werden, supra 
note 18, at 32–33 (footnotes omitted). 
 32. Id. at 32. 
 33. Suppose that, instead of a corporate fine or payouts in private cases, a corporation could 
offer up to the Department of Justice five executives who would each be sentenced to three years in 
prison. Suppose the corporation could pay each of the individuals involved $2 million per executive 
per year by depositing the appropriate sums in Swiss bank accounts. This would only cost the 
corporation $30 million, far less than many of the larger fines that have been imposed in recent 
years, and less than the private payouts in every one of the cases studied by the authors in their 
sample of private cases. 
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The total of the corporate fines imposed in every DOJ criminal 
antitrust case from 1990 to 2007 has been $4.167 billion.34 The total of 
the individual fines imposed in these cases has been $67 million.35
 
 
During this same period, the Antitrust Division has also secured 
restitution of $118 million in conjunction with criminal antitrust cases.36 
This largely or totally consists of restitution to the federal government 
for the overcharges it paid to price fixers. As the Division’s Workload 
Statistics notes with considerable understatement, “[f]requently 
restitution is not sought in criminal antitrust cases, as damages are 
obtained through treble damage actions filed by the victims.”37 
C. Deterrence Effects of Prison and House Arrest 
DOJ prosecutions also result in prison sentences and house arrests, 
which significantly deter illegal activity as well. From 1990 to 2007 
criminal prosecutions by the DOJ Antitrust Division resulted in 
sentences that total 330.24 years in prison.38 In addition, Antitrust 
Division activity also led to another 96.85 years of “house arrest or 
confinement to a halfway house or community treatment center.”39 
However, these figures might be somewhat inaccurate for the purposes at 
hand for two reasons. 
First, these figures are for time sentenced, not time served. We were 
unable to determine how much of this time actually was served or how 
often sentences were reduced.  
Second, sometimes an investigation by the Antitrust Division results 
in a sentence for an unrelated or marginally related crime, regardless of 
whether an antitrust violation was uncovered. Unrelated crimes can 
include perjury, mail fraud, contempt, obstruction of justice, and false 
statements.40 Since the Antitrust Division uncovered these crimes, often 
Antitrust Division investigators are in the best position to pursue these 
issues, even though they are not antitrust violations. They often do so 
 
 34. See infra Table 1. 
 35. See infra Table 2.  
 36. See infra Table 3.  
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 12 n.13. 
 38. See infra Table 4. We define one year as equal to 365.25 days. 
 39.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 13; see also infra Table 5.  
 40.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 8 (listing these crimes under the header “Other 
Criminal Cases”). 
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but, unfortunately, we have not been able to find out how frequently this 
occurs.41  
For simplicity, we are ignoring these issues. The figures reported 
above for prison time and house arrest therefore will be used in our 
subsequent analysis even though they are larger than they should be. As 
such, these unadjusted estimates will overestimate the probable 
deterrence effect of the DOJ anti-cartel program to some extent.Using 
these figures, how could we fairly value—or disvalue—time spent in 
prison or under house arrest? Since no one wants to spend any time in 
prison or under house arrest, should we disvalue it infinitely and assume 
that even a small probability of spending any time in prison or under 
house arrest has an infinite deterrence value? 
No. People do not act as if they infinitely disvalue the risk of getting 
put into prison or placed under house arrest for an antitrust offense. If 
they did, they would never try to form a cartel because this would put 
them at risk of getting caught and sentenced. Rather, potential offenders 
appear to tolerate the risk of prison. Perhaps they calculate, at least to 
some very rough degree, their apparent chances of getting caught and the 
prison sentence, house arrest, or fine they are likely to face. They then 
balance this chance of a penalty, again in an extremely rough way, 
against the rewards of cartelization. In any case, they often decide to 
form cartels. We know they often make this decision because cartelists 
surely know cartels are illegal, yet the number of cartels caught in recent 
years has been quite significant and does not seem to be decreasing.42 
 
 41.  Sometimes these other crimes are related to an antitrust offense—such as when a cartel 
bribes a federal purchasing agent. Other times they are not. Often they are very difficult to classify. 
According to the DOJ, “Other Federal Crimes such as Perjury, Mail Fraud, Contempt, Obstruction of 
Justice, or False Statements” have constituted 16% of their criminal convictions since 1990 (23% in 
recent years, when prison sentences have been longer). Id. 
 42.  The continued high number of DOJ grand juries, and the recent DOJ success rate in the 
courts, is evidence that many cartels still exist. As of the close of FY 2007, the DOJ had 
approximately 135 pending grand jury investigations. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring 
Meeting of the Dep’t of Justice: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones In the Antitrust 
Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 2 (Mar. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public /speeches/232716.pdf. Between 2000 and 2009, the DOJ filed 
anywhere from thirty-two to seventy-two criminal cases per year, most of which resulted in 
convictions. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000–2009 
4, 9 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ workload-statistics.pdf (last visited Feb. 
24, 2011). The following table, extracted from this data, shows the DOJ’s success in prosecuting 
antitrust violations: 
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From 1990–2007, 550 people were sentenced to prison or house arrest as 
a result of 958 successful Antitrust Division cases.43 Moreover, the large 
number of cartels discovered in recent years may be evidence that the 
current overall level of cartel sanctions is too low. 
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the disutility 
of prison time. To do this in practice is, of course, extremely difficult and 
speculative. There is no one objective way to compare the deterrence 
effect of time spent in prison to the deterrence effect of a criminal fine 
because different people would trade off jail versus fines in different 
ways. Any “average” figure used to equate the two is necessarily 
imprecise and arbitrary.  
We will undertake three different approaches to this issue. We hope 
that this Article’s use of three approaches will increase the reliability of 
its results. 
 
Total Criminal 
Cases 
‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
Filed 63 44 33 41 42 32 34 40 54 72 
Won 52 38 37 32 35 36 31 31 47 67 
Lost - 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 4 2 
Pending 35 39 34 42 48 43 44 54 57 60 
Appeal 
Decisions 
- 5 1 2 7 4 5 1 4 2 
Grand Juries 
Initiated 
26 26 26 48 21 38 38 34 32 38 
 
It seems clear that, in the opinion of a large number of judges, grand juries, and juries, the DOJ 
Antitrust Division has been bringing a large number of meritorious anti-cartel cases in recent years. 
Note that in some years the DOJ won more cases than it filed because the cases the DOJ won in any 
given year were often filed in an earlier year. 
 43. These 958 cases could be the total for both individual and corporate cases. If so, this 
figure would be significantly overcounting the “true” number of cartel offenses. According to the 
DOJ’s statistics, during this period 864 individuals were charged, as were 678 corporations. All 
totals for the years 1990–2007 were calculated by adding the yearly totals as reported in the U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1998 (on file with 
author) and the U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.  
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1. Valuations of lives and years of life for other regulatory, public policy 
purposes 
The valuation of one year of life “loss” in prison, or due to house 
arrest, is similar to one that, regrettably, society often must undertake for 
any number of public policy purposes. Sometimes a life must even be 
valued at an amount that is less than infinity. For example, our nation 
cannot afford perfect safety and we do not want every automobile to be 
built as safely as possible because society cannot afford this. Similarly, 
even though a life is beyond value and society does not want people to 
drive negligently, courts do not award infinite damages for the loss of 
life in car crashes. 
On average, studies that value lives in the United States for public 
policy purposes—e.g., when agencies set product safety, transportation, 
safety, or environmental requirements—typically arrive at values 
between $3 million and $10 million per life.44
 
By contrast, lower figures, 
on average between $1.4 million and $3.8 million, are awarded in 
wrongful death cases.45 Other studies analyze the data slightly differently 
by attempting to place a value on one year of life. They calculate figures 
in the range of an average of $300,000 to $500,000 per person per year 
of life (depending upon a number of variables).46
 
It is likely that most 
people would prefer the prospect of spending one year in prison to the 
prospect of losing one year of life; after all, many prisoners with no 
chance at parole still resist the death penalty. 
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the disutility 
of prison time. To do this in practice is extremely difficult and 
speculative. While there is no way to directly value the deterrence effect 
 
 44.  See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age 
and Cohort Effects, 90 REV. ECON & STAT. 573, 579 (2008). Recently the Department of 
Transportation has used $5.8 million for the value of a life. Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall, 
Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & D. J. Gribbin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp. to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., available at 
http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/policy/reports/080205.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). The 
Environmental Protection Agency currently uses $6.9 million. All Things Considered: Value on Life 
11 Percent Lower Than 5 Years Ago (NPR radio broadcast July 11, 2008), available at http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92470116. 
 45.  See Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, “Willingness to Award” Nonmonetary Damages 
and the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 165, 166, 179 (2003) 
(calculations made in 1995 dollars). 
 46.  See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 44, at 4. These figures are lower for older people. Id. A 
study by Stanford researchers calculated only $129,000 per year. Kathleen Kingsbury, The Value of 
Human Life: $129,000, TIME.COM (May 20, 2008), http:// 
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1808049,00.html. 
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of prison time, a conservative alternative is to assume that people would 
disvalue one year in prison the same as they would disvalue one year’s 
worth of life. This means the above results, which calculated the average 
value of one year of life to be worth $300,000 to $500,000 per year, 
should be assumed to be roughly equal to the average disvalue of one 
year in prison. Moreover, one year of house arrest should be disvalued at 
a significantly lower figure. 
2. Awards made by the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund 
Following the September 11th tragedy, Congress created the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (“the Fund”) to award 
compensation to victims’ families.47 Kenneth Feinberg was appointed 
Special Master and charged with deciding the appropriate amounts of 
compensation.48 The Fund sought to avoid a “complex adversarial 
process” while still honoring fairness and consistency.49 The Fund’s 
payments thus constitute a prominent reflection of the monetary value 
our society places on innocent human life, even though these payouts 
were made under unique circumstances.50 Significantly, the victims 
include a large number of middle class and upper class people who, at 
least in terms of their income and status as corporate executives, are 
likely to be roughly comparable to incarcerated price fixers. 
 
 47. See Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006) 
[hereinafter “the Act”] (we are grateful to Thomas Weaver for his research involving the September 
11th Victim Compensation Fund). 
 48. See generally 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 
FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 1–4 (2004) [hereinafter 
“FEINBERG REPORT”], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf . 
 49. See id. at 6. Congress mandated a “hybrid” compensation system. Like the tort system, 
Congress required the Special Master to consider economic and non-economic loss. However, unlike 
the tort system, the Special Master could not consider issues of liability or punitive damages, and the 
Special Master was required to reduce awards by payments from certain collateral sources. Id. A 
larger purpose of the Act was to save the airline industry from collapse and to protect the American 
economy from the consequences of that collapse by creating an alternative to direct litigation against 
the airlines. See id. at 3; see also generally Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000). 
 50.  The Special Master extensively researched “theories of compensation and methodologies 
for the calculation of economic loss, as well as the various state laws governing wrongful death 
actions,” and met with “numerous economists, experts and actuaries, both in the private sector and in 
the federal government” as to the calculation of economic loss and determinations on collateral 
sources. Between issuing its interim and final regulations, the Fund reviewed and sought to integrate 
“2,687 timely comments” on issues that ranged from the technical and specific, to fundamental 
questions regarding the larger purpose and policy of the Fund. See FEINBERG, supra note 48, at 4–5. 
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The Fund’s average award was $2,082,035 for damages to the direct 
victims of the terrorist attack, plus an average offset for collateral 
payments (damages to family members) of $855,826, for a total average 
award of $2,937,861. The median award was $1,677,632. The maximum 
award was $7,100,000, and the minimum award was $250,000.51  
Many of the September 11th victims had been quite affluent, 
including eighty-nine whose annual income had been between $500,000 
and $1,000,000 per year (their estates were given average awards of 
$4,749,654), and eight victims whose annual income exceeded 
$4,000,000 per year (their estates were given average awards of 
$6,379,287).52 Although we do not know the average or typical pre-
conviction annual incomes of imprisoned price fixers, we would not be 
surprised if the amounts were comparable. 
3. Awards in wrongful imprisonment cases 
Another approach to approximating the disutility of prison or house 
arrest time imposed for antitrust violations comes from examining the 
disvalue society places on prison time in a very different context: the 
compensation provided to people who have been wrongly imprisoned. 
Sometimes people are wrongly sentenced to prison in a miscarriage of 
justice by, for example, perjured testimony.53 The victims potentially can 
recover for a variety of torts, depending upon the jurisdiction.54 They can 
receive compensatory damages, emotional damages, punitive damages, 
or some combination thereof.55 Many of these situations involve suits 
 
 51. Id. at 110 tbl.12. 
 52. See infra Table 6.  
 53.  See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d. 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2007) (FBI was aware 
chief witness would perjure himself); see also Newsome v. McCabe 319 F.3d 301, 304–05 (7th Cir. 
2003) (officers induced eyewitnesses to falsely identify plaintiff); Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 
2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002) (investigating officer fabricated evidence). The 
authors are grateful to Thomas Weaver for locating and analyzing these cases, and for performing 
research on this subject. See Thomas Weaver, The Part That Counts: Wrongful Incarceration Awards 
and the Value of Human Life (unpublished manuscript) (May 2010) (on file with the authors). 
 54.  These torts include wrongful imprisonment, wrongful conviction, wrongful confinement, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
false arrest, or an unconstitutional depravation of their civil rights. See infra Appendix II, Table A. 
 55.  “Losses of this magnitude are almost impossible to catalogue. The loss of liberty. The 
loss of the enjoyment of their families. The loss of the ability to care for and nurture their children. 
The loss of intimacy and closeness with their spouses. Indeed, the task of quantifying these losses—
which I am obliged to do—is among the most difficult this Court has ever had to undertake. Where 
triers of fact must assign values to the intangible and invaluable, they may look to the values 
assigned by other fact-finders in the past. I do not blindly follow other awards, but I do look to them 
for perspective and as an indication of how society has valued these harms. I note also that damage 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:27 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
332 
against governmental actors, and sometimes the maximum awards in 
these cases are fixed by statute.56
 
Other times a suit is brought as a 
common law tort case. Often no award will be given for imprisonment 
due to a simple, albeit tragic, error; some type of intentional act, malice, 
or malfeasance is required.57  
We have located payments made in a total of nineteen wrongful 
imprisonment cases.58 The highest payment we found for a case 
involving at least one year of prison was $1.165 million per year, for 
three years of wrongful confinement for a false conviction.59 However, 
when shorter imprisonments are annualized, significantly higher figures 
sometimes resulted.60 By contrast, the lowest payment we found 
compensated the wrongfully imprisoned person at the rate of only 
$23,529 per year.61
 
The 75th percentile of these nineteen awards is 
approximately $1,000,000 per year; the 25th percentile is approximately 
 
and suffering do not accrue smoothly and proportionally on a monthly or annual basis. Some injury 
occurs all in a rush at the start—the shock and horror of arrest and conviction—while other injury 
only begins to compound after a significant period of time has passed—the setting in of despair, or 
the withering of relationships. I consider the particular story of this case and these plaintiffs’ 
suffering.” Limone, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 243.  
 56.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (West 2010).  
 57.  See, e.g., supra examples accompanying note 55. 
 58. See infra Appendix II, Table A. 
 59. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002). Suit 
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 yielded “damages in the amount of $221,976 for his economic losses, 
$3,537,000 to compensate him for 1,179 days of incarceration at the rate of $3,000 per day, and $1 
million to compensate him for emotional distress suffered between the date of the incident and the 
date of his sentencing.” Id. at *24. We arrived at the award per year of imprisonment of 
$1,138,951.77 in this case by multiplying $3,000 a day by 365.25 to arrive at $1,095,750. The lost 
earnings of $221,976, divided by 1,179 days in prison and multiplied by 365.25 days, comes to 
$188.28 per day and adds another $68,767.37 per year. The total award per year of imprisonment 
thus comes to $1,164,517.37. 
 60.  See id. (investigating officer fabricated evidence) (10-month sentence led to a $9 million 
settlement; this is an annual rate of $10,800,000). Because the emotional stress and discomfort could 
be disproportionately greater at the beginning of a prison sentence, it is unclear whether the award 
would have been increased proportionately if the victim had been imprisoned for one year, or for 
multiple years. As noted, in these cases it is difficult to segregate the amounts awarded for false 
imprisonment from the amounts awarded for onetime events or other torts. “Where the period of 
incarceration is shorter (e.g., less than one year), proportionately larger awards (measured by 
annualizing the award) have been rendered, presumably reflecting Limone’s observation that the 
injury from incarceration may be more intense towards the beginning.” Smith v. City of Oakland, 
538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and 
Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
419, 431 (1980) (noting that “the declining marginal utility of imprisonment means that each 
increment of incarceration increases the perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount; or, 
reduced to its simplest terms, a two-year prison term is not twice as bad as a one-year term”).  
 61.  See Avery v. Manitowoc Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2006).  
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$140,000 per year.62 We should note, however, that these results are 
complicated and may be ambiguous because the cases often also 
involved allegations of, and sometimes specific awards for, false arrest, 
false conviction, overly harsh interrogation techniques, malicious 
prosecution, and other factors.63 Rarely are these awards unambiguously 
and solely for false imprisonment. 
In addition to the nineteen final awards, we found many others that 
were not included in our study because the false imprisonment awards 
were too confounded with compensation for the initial arrest or were not 
yet final.64 For a variety of reasons, including our small sample size, the 
near certainty that our research failed to uncover many cases, the 
existence of secret settlements, and the confounding of awards for false 
imprisonment with awards for related torts such as intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, we present the mean ($1,267,369, which was 
significantly affected by two very high annualized awards for 
imprisonment of less than one year) and median ($214,286) of these 
results with great reluctance. One reason for our hesitation concerns the 
income levels of the people involved. We have not been able to ascertain 
any of the falsely imprisoned defendants’ incomes, but we suspect most 
had a low income. Although some were middle class,65 few or none of 
the wrongfully imprisoned people appear to have been corporate 
executives or upper-class professionals.66 It is possible that a jury or 
judge would award a corporate executive wrongfully imprisoned for 
price fixing a larger than average amount for their suffering.67 Still, these 
results do tend to show that figures in the neighborhood of $1 million per 
year appear generally to be the practical maximum that society is willing 
to award for one year wrongfully spent in prison. 
 
 62.  See infra Appendix II, Table A. 
 63.  For example, one case involved a month in jail and an award of $355,500 for false 
imprisonment, as well as “$71,100 for false arrest; $71,100 for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress . . . and $213,300 for malicious prosecution.” Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83C2430, 1987 
WL 19800, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 64.  For examples, see Weaver, supra note 53.  
 65.  For example, see Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff was 
an unemployed paralegal, although he testified at trial that he was employed at the time incarceration 
began. 
 66.  See Appendix II, Table A. 
 67.  It is possible, however, that a jury might react in the opposite direction. A jury might be 
less sympathetic to imprisoned upper-class corporate executives. 
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4. Estimates by antitrust scholars 
A fourth approach is to assemble and analyze similar estimates by 
scholars. We have been able to find only two estimates for the disutility 
of one year in prison for an antitrust offense that seem plausible in this 
context.68 Both were made by extremely reputable scholars. Both are 
roughly consistent with the estimates above. 
First, an article by Professors Howard P. Marvel and others equated 
one year in jail for price fixing to approximately $600,000 in 2010 
dollars.69 Another study by Professor Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt and 
others equated one year in jail for price fixing with a fine of $1.5 million 
today.70 These figures are higher than the average valuations for one year 
of life noted earlier, perhaps because price fixers are wealthier on 
average and can afford to disvalue prison time much more than most 
people can, or perhaps because price fixers’ time is more valuable on 
average.71  
5. A conservative resolution of the issue 
These four approaches yield estimates that are broadly consistent 
with one another. To be conservative, we have taken the highest of these 
estimates for the disvalue of one year in prison, $1,500,000 per year, and 
 
 68. We have found one other estimate, but it seems to value prison time at an unduly low 
level for white-collar criminals. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: 
Forcing Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 283 & n. 52 
(2008) (estimating value of prison at approximately $200 per day, which amounts to slightly more 
than $70,000 per year). 
 69.  See Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 561, 573 (1988). The authors equated one year in prison with a $300,000 fine. The 
article appeared in the February 1988 issue, so we assume they were using 1987 dollars. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates $300,000 in 1987 to $577,825 
in 2010. See CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Mar. 
17, 2011). 
 70.  Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study 
of Law and Economics, in 16 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 25 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 
1994) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =712721. This article equated 
one year in jail with a fine of $1 million. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index 
inflation calculator equates $1,000,000 in 1994 and $1,431,802 in 2010. See CPI INFLATION 
CALCULATOR, supra note 69. Professors Dau-Schmidt et al. were using 1982 data for much of their 
paper’s analysis. If they meant their valuation of one year in jail to be expressed in 1982 dollars, then 
their $1,000,000 estimate would be the equivalent of $2,198,891 in 2010. Id.  
 71.  Whether the time or the life of a price fixer is more, or less, valuable than that of an 
average person is an interesting philosophical question that this Article will not explore. 
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arbitrarily increased it to $2 million.72 We will use this as the disvalue or 
deterrence equivalent of one year in prison. We will use $1 million for 
the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of one year of house arrest. We 
note that $2 million is as much as the lowest estimates for the value of a 
human life noted earlier. We believe these figures are significantly more 
than the average deterrence effect of one year in prison (or, a fortiori, of 
one year of house arrest, but we are selecting them so that our 
methodology will be conservative and as non-controversial as 
possible).73  
Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of incarceration has 
the same deterrence effect as a $2 million fine, the collective 330.24 
years of prison sentences received by antitrust defendants from 1990 to 
2007 would be the equivalent of about $660 million in criminal fines. 
Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of house arrest has the 
same deterrence effect as a $1 million fine, the collective 96.85 years of 
house arrest received by antitrust defendants from 1990 to 2007 would 
be the equivalent of nearly $97 million in criminal fines. These figures 
total about $757 million.  
As noted earlier, however, penalties directed against the individuals 
involved might well have more of a deterrence effect than penalties 
directed against the corporations. To illustrate how this could affect our 
analysis, we have trebled the deterrence effect of every individual 
penalty before adding them to the corporate penalties. This means using 
$6 million for the deterrence value of one year in prison74 and $3 million 
for the deterrence value of one year of house arrest, and also trebling the 
$67 million in individual penalties.75 Thus, the $757 million calculated 
 
 72.  We do not believe $2 million is the true cost or deterrent value of one year in prison. We 
nevertheless decided to use this figure, which we believe to be unduly high, in our subsequent 
analysis in order to take a conservative and relative non-controversial approach to the issue. 
 73.  We note that valuing one year’s worth of life at $2 million would mean that a twenty 
year prison sentence would be valued at $40 million, a figure far in excess of the amount that society 
places on an individual’s life. 
 74. We note that valuing one year’s worth of life at $6 million would mean that a twenty year 
prison sentence would be valued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the amount that society 
places on an individual’s life. 
 75. This assumes that the individuals actually pay their own fines. It is, however, difficult to 
determine whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are ultimately paid by the 
employees, or are often, or usually, directly or indirectly paid by their employer. This area of law is 
exceedingly complex, and, of course, even if indemnification is illegal, this does not mean that it 
does not occur regularly. See 1 ROGER MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 9:37 (West 
November 2009); Pamela H. Bucey, Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An 
Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The 
Problems Posed By Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963).  
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earlier would be increased to $2.271 billion, and the $67 million in 
individual fines would be increased to $201 million. Add to these figures 
the $4.166 billion in corporate fines and $118 million in restitution, and 
the quantifiable deterrence effect of the Antitrust Division’s remedies 
from 1990 to 2007 totals $6.756 billion. If the corporate fines, individual 
fines, and restitution figures are converted to 2010 dollars and added to 
the $2.271 billion equivalent for prison time and house arrest,76 the total 
would be $7.737 billion.  
One final note about DOJ enforcement is appropriate. Its record of 
overwhelming success suggests the government pursues only very strong 
cases. Note, for example, that for the years 1992 to 2008, the DOJ filed 
699 cases and won 645 cases.77 This would appear to translate to a 
winning rate of over 92%. To be sure, this percentage may be misleading 
because the DOJ’s win rate in court is significantly lower.78 Moreover, 
the cases filed in a given year generally are not the ones resolved in that 
year. Still, such a high success rate demonstrates that the DOJ does not 
like to lose. We do not mean this point as a criticism. It may well be 
appropriate for the government to bring litigation only if it is very 
confident it will win. But that comes at a cost. The DOJ appears much 
more willing to tolerate a false negative (a failure to prosecute a violation 
of the antitrust laws) than a false positive (litigating a case when in fact 
there was no violation). In other words, it appears the DOJ chooses not to 
pursue litigation in many meritorious cases, perhaps at least in part 
because it lacks the necessary resources. This may well create a need for 
private litigation as a complement to government enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.79 
III. DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE LITIGATION 
We know of no information concerning how much defendants have 
paid in total as a result of private antitrust litigation during this same or 
any other period. We do not even know of extraordinarily rough 
estimates.  
 
 76. See infra Table 15. 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10. 
 78.  See John M. Connor, Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases, 56 
ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming Spring 2011). 
 79.  The ideal proportion of success to failure will depend on a number of variables, 
including the relative harms from false negatives and false positives and the likelihood of false 
negatives to false positives. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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One extremely low floor on this amount, however, can be obtained 
from the Lande/Davis study of forty of the largest private antitrust cases 
that ended between 1990 and 2007.80 Our primary screen was that each 
case must have returned $50 million or more to victims of antitrust 
violations. Actually, they were “alleged” victims because almost all the 
cases settled with no finding that defendants had violated the antitrust 
laws.81
 
We did not want to make subjective judgments over whether to 
value products at their retail value, their wholesale value, or defendants’ 
cost. We counted all products as being worth nothing. We did the same 
thing for coupons or for discounts because they all have uncertain 
redemption rates: all discounts and coupons were counted as zero.82 
This study documents between $18 and $19.6 billion in cash paid by 
defendants in these forty cases alone. In 2010 dollars, these totals would 
be $21.9 billion to $23.9 billion.83 Since this total does not include any 
value for the products, discounts, or coupons received in these cases, and 
also leaves out defendants’ attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs 
(including expert witness fees) and the disruptive effects of the litigation 
on corporate efficiency, it understates the actual deterrence from these 
cases because all these omitted factors also have deterrence effects.84 
 
 80.  This was not a cost/benefit analysis of private enforcement. We made no attempt to 
assess any of its costs, or all of its benefits. Rather, the main point of this project was to assess those 
benefits that easily could be quantified. We did not select a random sample of private cases and 
follow them cradle to grave, assessing the merits or lack of merits of each. This would be difficult to 
do since almost every private case is dismissed or settled, and for this reason it would be hard to find 
out the relevant information about each case. We did not limit ourselves to cases where the Court 
found an antitrust violation because these are rare. Only twenty-four final cartel cases calculated an 
overcharge since 1890. See Connor & Lande, supra note 16. For a list of cases and their recoveries 
see infra Table 7. 
 81.  See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 891 n.46. 
 82.  We eliminated many cases because they were too difficult to value, even cases valued in 
the press at more than $1 billion. Moreover, sometimes it was just not possible to get the necessary 
information out of old files or from the preoccupied lawyers possessing the necessary information.  
  We did not adjust the settlements for inflation by raising them to their present value. Nor 
did we subtract attorneys’ fees or other claims administration expenses because, for deterrence 
purposes, it does not matter what happened to the money paid by Defendants. 
  We did not attempt to value injunctive relief, even for those cases where a Court 
characterized this relief as being very important. Although injunctions can greatly benefit both 
victims and the economy as a whole, we were unable to ascertain an objective and reliable way to 
quantify the value of injunctive relief. Neither did we attempt to value the injunctive relief secured 
by the DOJ. For more on our methodology, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 889–91. 
 83. See infra Table 14.  
 84. As noted earlier, injunctive relief secured by these forty cases also was omitted, further 
understating the deterrence value of these cases. However, the effects of injunctive relief secured by 
DOJ cases were also excluded. 
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In terms of overall deterrence, therefore, these forty private cases 
resulted in approximately three times the deterrence of the $7.737 billion 
in deterrence produced by every criminal case brought by the DOJ 
during this same period in 2010 dollars. As noted earlier, this comparison 
is not just to DOJ actions involving these forty private cases; the DOJ 
total is for every cartel sanction secured by the Division between 1990 
and 2007. 
In addition to comparing the probable amount of deterrence from the 
recoveries in the forty large private cases to the likely deterrence from 
the DOJ sanctions, there are a number of other comparisons that could be 
made, such as deterrence from all the DOJ cartel cases to the subsamples 
of the forty private cases that were against cartels, or where the DOJ also 
obtained relief, or where the DOJ also received a criminal penalty. For 
each comparison, the private deterrence is at least as large as the DOJ 
deterrence.
 85 
 
 85. For example, not all of these forty cases were against cartels; some were against 
monopolies (although none of the many class actions against Microsoft were included due to data 
problems). Using nominal dollars, of the total recoveries of $18 to 19.6 billion, $9.2 to $10.6 billion 
was paid in twenty-five cases that were litigated under the per se approach. This sample of twenty-
five cases thus excludes payouts by monopolies. Comparing this $9.2 to $10.6 billion to the $6.756 
billion in DOJ deterrence calculated earlier shows that these twenty-five private cases alone 
probably deterred more anticompetitive behavior than the entire DOJ criminal antitrust enforcement.  
  Another comparison involves only cases in which the government obtained some sort of 
relief. This comparison might appeal to those who praise government action and are skeptical of 
private enforcement. They might doubt whether the purely private cases were meritorious. (It is 
important to note that, for the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, almost all of the private cases we 
included have strong indicia of being meritorious.) As Table 8 reflects, see infra, the plaintiffs in the 
twenty-four cases validated by some sort of successful government action recovered between $10.34 
and $11.973 billion in nominal dollars. Even the lower of these amounts is over 150% of the $6.756 
billion in nominal dollars in deterrence produced by every criminal case brought by DOJ during the 
same period.  
  Yet another interesting comparison is to the thirteen cases in the Lande/Davis sample that 
also involved a DOJ action that resulted in a criminal penalty. These thirteen private cases yielded 
$5.6 to $7.0 billion in nominal dollar payments, roughly the same as the $6.756 billion DOJ nominal 
dollar total. Of course, it could be argued that a better comparison might be limited to the deterrence 
effect of the DOJ action in those thirteen cases, rather than all of the DOJ cases from the same time 
frame.  
  Further, the larger, per se sample surely includes some cases that could not have resulted 
in criminal penalties, so one could argue that the comparison to only those cases involving criminal 
penalties is the fairer one. However, criminal conduct is not the only anticompetitive conduct; so too 
is all per se illegal conduct. We should be grateful to the private cases for discouraging any per se 
illegal conduct. Finally, DOJ fines must be proven to a criminal standard, while private cases operate 
under a civil standard. Perhaps the fairer comparison is, after all, to the deterrence from the sample 
of twenty-five per se cases, or to the deterrence from all forty cases. DOJ did little or nothing to 
discourage the conduct in many of these non-criminal cases. The only deterrence came from the 
private actions. 
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Alternatively, one could redo this analysis using different values for 
the disincentive effect of one year in jail. For example, instead of our 
assumed disvalue of $6 million for one year in prison, one could use a 
low estimate of $3 million or a high estimate of $12 million for the 
disvalue of one year in prison (i.e., $1 million per month).86
 
Similarly, 
one could use $1.5 million and $6 million estimates for the deterrence 
effects of one year of house arrest instead of our $3 million assumption. 
Doing this would of course change the total estimated deterrence effects 
of the DOJ criminal enforcement program. Using 2010 dollars, the low 
estimates would decrease the $7.737 billion DOJ deterrence estimate to 
$5.571 billion. The high estimates would increase the DOJ deterrence 
estimate to $8.689 billion.87 These are still much lower than the recovery 
totals in (and resulting deterrence from) the private cases.88 
Alternatively, one could ask how much one year in prison and one 
year of house arrest have to be disvalued on average for the deterrence 
effects of the Antitrust Division’s entire criminal anti-cartel program 
from 1990 to 2007 to equal the deterrence value of the forty large private 
cases from the same period (and, of course, also considering the 
corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution that the DOJ secured). 
Only if the deterrence effects of prison time was $43–48 million per year 
on average (i.e., slightly more than $3.5 to $4.0 million per month), and 
the deterrence effects of house arrest was $21.5–24 million per year on 
average, would the entire DOJ anti-cartel program produce as much 
deterrence as these forty cases.89 
 
 86.  Even the $3 million estimate for the disutility associated with one year in prison is as 
large as some of the estimates of the value of a life according to some of the studies cited earlier. See 
supra notes 27–29. The $12 million estimate would be at the upper end of the range of estimates of 
the value of a human life calculated by these studies. See supra notes 27–29. (From a philosophical 
perspective, is one year of the life of a price fixer really “worth” the same as an average human life?)  
 87.  If we were to use the $12 million figure for the value of one year in prison and $6 
million for one year of house arrest, the deterrence value of all the DOJ anti-cartel programs since 
1990 would rise significantly. Using 2010 dollars, the total DOJ deterrence figure would rise from 
$7.731 billion to $8.136 billion, more than the amounts that defendants paid in the thirteen private 
cases that also had a criminal penalty, but less than the deterrence value of the twenty-five per se 
cases in the sample, and less than half of the more than $21billion paid in all 40 cases in the sample. 
See infra Tables 9 & 10.  
 88.  Even these larger nominal figures yield results that are less than the nominal $9.2 to 
$10.6 billion secured by the twenty-five private per se cases, or the nominal $10.34 to $11.973 
billion paid in the twenty-four cases that also resulted in government relief, much less the nominal 
$18 billion or more from all forty cases. 
 89. 330.24 years in prison disvalued at $43–48million per year plus 96.85 years of house 
arrest disvalued at $21.5–24 million per year, plus the $5.466 billion total for corporate, individual 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:27 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
340 
IV. WERE THE PRIVATE CASES MERITORIOUS? 
If the criticisms of private antitrust enforcement noted earlier are 
correct and private actions often obtain results in cases that lack merit, 
not only might they fail to discourage anticompetitive behavior, they 
might discourage legal—and beneficial—conduct. In other words, they 
might have the opposite of a beneficial deterrence effect! For several 
reasons, however, this concern is likely misplaced, at least with respect 
to most of the forty cases we studied. 
First, even though almost all of the forty cases were only settlements, 
it should be recalled that a federal judge approved these settlements. 
While this certainly is not the same as a verdict, a diverse and generally 
conservative group of federal judges did ratify that the settlements were 
fair to members of the plaintiff classes. We note that of the forty-five 
federal judges who approved the settlements or otherwise presided over 
part or all of the cases we studied, twenty-seven were appointed by a 
Republican president.90 We also note that these judges approved these 
cases during an era where every Supreme Court antitrust decision has 
been decided in favor of the defendant. Each of the last fifteen antitrust 
decisions, made by a court rated by Judge Posner as the most 
conservative since 1930,91 including every case decided after 1992 
through 2009, went against plaintiffs.92 Given that this tide of pro-
defendant instruction effectively tells the lower courts how to decide 
 
fines and restitution, equals $21.7 to $23.6 billion. This is roughly the same as the private totals of 
$21.9–$23.9 billion. All figures are calculated using 2010 dollars 
 90.  See infra Table 11. 
 91.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 6–7, 18, 46 tbl.3 (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2009), 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 775 (2009)  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1126403.  
 92.  Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (9–0 in the 
judgment, 5–4 in regard to the Court’s opinion); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (5–4 decision); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (9–0); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (7–2); Credit 
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) (7–1); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. 
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (7–2); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (8–
0); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (8–0); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (9–0); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo 
Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004) (9–0); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 
U.S. 155 (2004) (8–0); California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1998); Nynex Corp. v. 
Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown v. Pro Football, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Book Ends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term 
in Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007) (“The last clear plaintiffs’ victories in the Court 
occurred in 1992 in two cases, [Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 
(1992)] and [FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)].”). 
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close cases, and given that the high percentage of judges presiding in the 
litigation we studied were appointed by Republican presidents, one 
would not expect that approval of the class action settlements would be 
based on any pre-existing excessive sympathy for plaintiffs’ attorneys.93  
Second, a large number of the opinions in the forty cases contain 
generous and gratuitous praise for the plaintiffs’ counsel handling the 
case.94 Of the eight judges from whom we were able to discover explicit 
and generous praise for the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys (in none of 
the cases did we discover criticism), five were appointed by a Republican 
president.95 This too helps give assurance that the cases brought by 
private counsel generally were in the public interest. 
Third, an advantage of our selecting only cases that returned more 
than $50 million in cash benefits to victims is that this screens out 
nuisance settlements. We are very skeptical about claims that defending 
these suits often costs innocent firms $10 million or more. We would 
believe this only for very unusual cases. Regardless, $50 million should 
be well above the nuisance value of an unmeritorious case. Moreover, 
the majority of the cases we studied (23/40) settled for more than $100 
million.96 
Fourth, since actions that settle for more than $50 million are not 
nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect the defendants’ 
perception that they could well lose on the merits, not only at trial but 
also on appeal. To be sure, some may assert that defendants settle 
regardless of the merits of their cases simply because they are risk 
averse. This may sometimes be true. Of course, the risk to which they are 
averse is that they may lose. Moreover, plaintiffs—or, in contingency fee 
cases, plaintiffs’ counsel—also tend to be averse to risk, probably more 
so than defendants. Plaintiff’s lawyers often pay millions of dollars 
toward the costs of litigation—both in terms of out of pocket expenses 
and in terms of the implicit value of thousands of hours of their time—all 
 
 93. See infra Appendix I, Table 11. We do not mean to suggest that judges act on crass 
political commitments in presiding over litigation or that party affiliation correlates perfectly with 
attitudes toward plaintiffs in class actions. Our point is that our analysis is supported to the extent 
party affiliation might serve as an extremely crude and rough check on whether the judges in the 
cases we studied were unduly sympathetic to class counsel’s efforts.  
 94. For examples, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 903–04. 
 95. See id. at 903–04, 914 tbl.10. 
 96. It is difficult for a firm to believably claim, in effect: “We are saints who did absolutely 
nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 million or more just to make the case go 
away.” While we are not saying this can never happen, as the settlements get higher, this argument 
loses credibility. 
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of which will be uncompensated if the case proceeds to trial and 
defendants prevail. This could give plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to 
settle for amounts that are too low. Defendants’ attorneys, by contrast, 
are paid by the hour, so they do not have the same kind of risk aversion 
incentives. In sum, there is no basis for believing that defendants are 
more risk averse than plaintiffs. If anything, we believe the reverse could 
well be true.97 For these reasons, settlement values are at least as likely 
to be too low as they are to be too high.98 
A final reason to believe that the cases we studied were generally 
meritorious is that most were validated in whole or in part by means 
other than settlement in private litigation. This validation took various 
forms:  
1. In thirteen of the forty cases (32.5%), defendants or their 
employees were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty 
pleas.  
2. In twelve of the forty cases (30%), government enforcers obtained 
a civil recovery, usually in the form of a consent order.  
3. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed 
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment).  
4. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), defendants lost at trial in the 
private litigation or in a closely related case.  
5. In at least three out of forty cases (7.5%) plaintiffs survived a 
motion to dismiss.99  
In sum, thirty-four of the forty cases (85%) had at least one of these 
indicators that plaintiffs’ case was meritorious. (This total would be 
 
 97.  It could be argued that plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes have an incentive to “sell out their 
clients” by settling for too low an amount, too quickly—that their incentive is just to take less money 
than the victims deserve and then to move on to the next case. Moreover, in class action cases, 
plaintiffs have difficulty effectively policing their counsel so the possibility of settlements that are 
too quick and too low is a serious one. By contrast, it could be argued that defense lawyers have the 
incentive to delay and reject reasonable offers and thereby bill as many hours as possible, even if 
defendants’ clients are in a better position to oversee their attorneys’ activities than plaintiffs. For a 
further discussion of these issues, see Joshua P. Davis and Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable 
Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 
41 RUTGERS L.J. 355 (2009); Joshua P. Davis and Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and 
the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969 (2010). 
 98.  Others may also say that defendants worry that they will lose when they should not. This 
raises a philosophical issue. If the courts say conduct violates the antitrust laws, and if an appellate 
court, perhaps even the Supreme Court, confirms liability, is it meaningful to say that the outcome is 
wrong? For practical purposes, we adopt a positivist’s view and suggest that the law is whatever the 
ultimate court declares it to be. Any other perspective would make a study like ours infeasible. 
 99. In fact, the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss may be 
higher. We did not consistently note this aspect of the litigation we studied. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:27 PM 
315 Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement 
 343 
thirty-three if motions to dismiss are not included. The percentages 
appear to total more than 100% because eight of the forty cases involved 
more than one basis for validation.) Table 12, infra, summarizes this 
information. Table 13, infra, lists the cases in which the merits received 
each kind of validation. 
 
Table 12: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Cases 
 
Kind of Validation of Merits Number of Cases 
Criminal Penalty 13 out of 40 (32.5%) 
Government Obtained Civil Relief 12 out of 40 (30%) 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related 
Case 
9 out of 40 (22.5%) 
Ps Survived or Prevailed at 
Summary Judgment 
9 out of 40 (22.5%) 
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss 3 out 40 (7.5%) 
At Least One Basis for Validation 34 out of 40 (85%) 
At Least One Basis for Validation, 
Not Including Surviving Motion to 
Dismiss 
33 out of 40 (82.5%) 
 
Ultimately, there is no way to prove or fully refute assertions that 
many or most private cases are unmeritorious and are tantamount to 
extortion. But the above analysis offers reasons to conclude that all of the 
cases we studied involved legitimate claims, and there is no reason to 
believe otherwise, beyond defendants’ self-serving assertions. 
V. QUALIFICATIONS AND CAVEATS 
Throughout this article, we have explicitly or implicitly added a large 
number of qualifications and caveats to our analysis. Some of the most 
important are worth recapitulating briefly so the conclusions presented in 
the next section can be assessed fairly. 
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Concerning DOJ enforcement, corporate criminal fines and all 
restitution and payments in private cases are made by the corporations 
involved. Prison terms and house arrests (which are virtually impossible 
to value accurately) are served by the individuals involved, and the 
individual fines are often paid by the individuals involved.100 We are 
adding the deterrence effects of all these together to arrive at a measure 
of total deterrence. We are implicitly assuming that the corporations 
involved are profit-maximizing and that the executives involved care 
what happens to their employers. We recognize there are agent/principal 
problems and behavioral economics issues as well. As noted above, some 
executives may care only or primarily about the sanctions directed 
against them as individuals; some may care equally what happens to their 
employer (either out of professional pride, corporate loyalty, or because 
of how a corporate sanction could affect their career); other executives 
might care about both, but weigh the individual sanctions more heavily. 
To these agent/principal problems, we have arbitrarily tripled the 
deterrence effects of the individual sanctions (prison, house arrest, and 
fines) compared to the corporate payouts (fines, restitution, and payouts 
in private cases). 
Concerning private enforcement, the $18–19.6 billion in payments 
made in forty large private antitrust cases is only an extremely low floor 
on the total deterrence effects of private antitrust enforcement, for many 
reasons. While these were among the largest private antitrust cases 
brought during the relevant time period, surely the total paid by 
defendants in the thousands of private antitrust cases that ended during 
this period was many times as large. This total also omitted the 
deterrence value of the products, discounts, services, and coupons that 
were part of the relief in these cases. 
Concerning the DOJ/private comparison, the comparison of the 
relative deterrence from private and DOJ cases did not attempt to value 
the injunctive relief or legal precedent obtained in either type of case. 
The deterrence effects of defendants’ attorneys’ fees and the stress and 
time involved for defendants in defending both the DOJ and the private 
cases has also been omitted. These are significant omissions. This 
Article’s analysis assumes the effects of these omitted factors would be 
 
 100. For a discussion on whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are 
ultimately paid by the employees, or whether they are often or usually directly or indirectly paid by 
their employer, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *.  
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the same for both private enforcement and DOJ enforcement, but we 
know of no way to ascertain whether this is true.101  
Further, reasonable people could dispute who first discovered some 
of the violations that gave rise to the sample of forty large private cases. 
The Lande/Davis study concluded, on the basis of admittedly imperfect 
public information and interviews with attorneys, that sixteen of these 
forty cases originally had been discovered by private parties and their 
counsel, ten were follow-ons to government enforcement actions, and the 
others had mixed or uncertain origins. This figure for follow-on cases of 
10/40, or 25%, is consistent with a survey by Kauper & Snyder, which 
found that only 20% of private cases were follow-on cases.102
 
Moreover, 
at least nine of the private follow-on cases (9/40 or 22.5%) were 
significantly broader than the DOJ case: they involved more defendants 
than the DOJ case, more causes of action, greater relief (in some 
instances the only relief), or longer periods of illegality.103  
If, contrary to our findings, every one of the forty private antitrust 
violations had originally been uncovered by the DOJ (even private 
actions where the DOJ never filed a case), this fact would complicate an 
analysis of the relative deterrence effects of private and public antitrust 
enforcement. The DOJ certainly should get partial credit for the private 
recoveries obtained in any cases it uncovered or helped to uncover, even 
if the private parties secured the bulk of the sanctions.104 Nevertheless, it 
 
 101.  The only indication of the relative value of the precedents that were established comes 
from the Calkins study, which concluded that the most important precedents in recent years were 
established through private litigation. Calkins, supra note 11. 
 102. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) (“Although the conventional wisdom has long been that class 
actions tend to ‘tag along’ on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust 
litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at ‘[l]ess than 20% of private 
antitrust actions filed between 1976 and 1983.’” (quoting Moore, Data Galore in Georgetown 
Damage Study, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1985, at 24, col.4)). 
 103.  See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 910 tbl.6. 
 104. Each type of plaintiff might make a different contribution to the deterrence mix. As we 
noted in Global Competition Litigation Review:  
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that, as a practical matter the government 
cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcing for various reasons 
including: budgetary constraints; undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of 
industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were 
in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; 
and the unfortunate reality that government enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions 
are at times politically motivated. Not surprisingly, a vigorous private antitrust or 
competition regime is likely to confer significant benefits over and above those conferred 
by a system reliant solely upon government enforcement.  
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would not be fair to give the DOJ complete credit for any resulting 
deterrence, because if there had been no private enforcement, this 
deterrence never would have arisen. Rather, the fairest thing would be to 
share credit for this deterrence between the public and private enforcers. 
Another general caveat concerns how, from a deterrence perspective, 
perceptions can be more important than the realities this article has 
attempted to document. For example, Professor Stephen Calkins, who is 
from Detroit, noted the extraordinary prominence in Michigan of Alfred 
Taubman. Calkins said that the extensive press coverage of Mr. 
Taubman’s being sent to (and later released from) prison for an antitrust 
offense sent a message to business leaders that no imaginable fine could 
equal.105 In this regard, some of the stereotypes about private enforcers 
also could help to deter antitrust violations. Irwin Stelzer articulated the 
widely held belief: “An army of private enforcers, enlisting help from 
attorney-entrepreneurs free to accept cases on a contingency fee basis, 
freed of ‘loser pays’ obligations, is an important supplement to those 
limited [government] resources.”106 Although defendants to a large 
extent have succeeded in portraying plaintiffs’ attorneys as the modern 
economy’s bogeymen, their fears of this swarming private “army” might 
do a great deal to discourage anticompetitive conduct, despite the fact 
that many recent court decisions have weakened private enforcement 
substantially.107 
Finally, this Article is not attempting to perform a cost/benefit 
analysis of private antitrust enforcement. Many others have asserted 
problems with private enforcement (although without any systematic 
evidence), and we readily agree that some private cases have not been in 
the public interest. Nevertheless, we believe the debate over private 
antitrust enforcement deserves balance.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Our primary conclusion is that the benefits of private antitrust 
enforcement are substantial and underappreciated. The importance of 
 
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Of Myths and Evidence: An Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for 
Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for Competition Law Violations, 2 GLOBAL 
COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 126, 18–19 (2009).  
 105.  Stephen Calkins, Remarks at the George Washington University Law School Antitrust 
Conference (Feb. 27, 2009). 
 106.  Irwin Stelzer, Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy, Address at the 
Office of Fair Trading’s Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Oct. 19, 2006).  
 107. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
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private enforcement to compensation perhaps requires little elaboration 
because there is no meaningful alternative means for victims of 
anticompetitive behavior to recover for the harm they suffered as a result 
of antitrust violations. Perhaps more surprisingly, there is evidence that 
private antitrust enforcement does more than DOJ criminal enforcement 
to deter anticompetitive behavior.  
It is, of course, extremely difficult to isolate successes in the antitrust 
world. Even if a particular private case succeeded in forcing violators to 
surrender $100 million or more to their victims, it often would be 
reasonable to credit many parties in addition to the victims and their 
counsel. A case could rely in whole or in part on a conspiracy uncovered 
or partly uncovered by an earlier DOJ investigation, as well as on a legal 
precedent established by a State Attorney General in an unrelated case; 
and the case itself could have been financed by private counsel who was 
able to do so only because of success in a prior private litigation. As 
always, success has many parents. Rather than enter into fruitless 
arguments about which type of enforcement is entitled to what 
percentage of the credit, and, regardless of whether it is viewed from a 
deterrence or compensation perspective, perhaps the safest conclusion is 
that private enforcement is an important complement to government 
enforcement.  
Moreover, the cost to the taxpayer of the deterrence and 
compensation that arises from private enforcement is practically 
nonexistent. The only cost to the taxpayer is the cost of maintaining 
some portion of the judicial system. This amounts to only a tiny fraction 
of the benefits of private enforcement and would be incurred even if all 
these cases were brought by government enforcers.  
In addition, the high success rate of government litigation suggests 
that in the absence of private litigation, many bad actors would get away 
with violating the antitrust laws. In most cases, if the law is somewhat 
unclear, or if the evidence of illegal conduct is not absolutely compelling 
at the outset of a legal action, the DOJ does not seem to be willing to 
pursue litigation. This may well be the appropriate approach for the 
government to take. But it holds the potential for antitrust laws to go 
largely unenforced. 
Within this context, private litigation of the antitrust laws seems to 
play a crucial role. In the United States, the anticompetitive conduct that 
gives rise to government enforcement currently occurs far too frequently, 
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even factoring in the effects of the present system of private litigation.108 
A fortiori, this conduct would be even more underdeterred if the United 
States’ eliminated or substantially curtailed private enforcement. We 
would be surprised if firms in other nations were significantly more law 
abiding than U.S. firms, and we suspect that the United States’ record of 
underdeterrence of anticompetitive conduct (and undercompensation of 
victims) exists in many if not most other nations as well. Although each 
nation has unique needs, history, institutions, capabilities, and 
circumstances, and we would never advocate a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to competition legislation, we do urge every nation without 
private enforcement of its competition laws to seriously consider 
permitting victim suits.109 
 
 
APPENDIX I: TABLES 
Table 1: Total Corporate Antitrust Fines 1990–2007110  
 
Year (Fiscal) Total Corporate Fines ($000) 
1990 22,658 
1991 17,573 
1992 22,430 
1993 40,427 
1994 38,996 
1995 40,222 
1996 25,245 
 
 108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 109. Europeans often believe that public enforcement should be concerned with deterrence 
while private enforcement should be concerned with compensation of victims. See Wouter P.J. Wils, 
The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32 
WORLD COMPETITION 3, passim (2009). We believe that the deterrence effects of private 
enforcement should be given greater consideration.  
 110. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1999 12, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 12. 
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1997 203,931 
1998 241,645 
1999 959,866 
2000 303,241 
2001 270,778 
2002 93,826 
2003 63,752 
2004 140,586 
2005 595,966 
2006 469,805 
2007 615,671 
Total 4,166,618 
 
 
Table 2: Total Individual Antitrust Fines 1990–2007111 
 
Year (Fiscal) Total Individual Fines ($000) 
1990 917 
1991 2,806 
1992 1,275 
1993 1,868 
1994 1,240 
1995 1,211 
1996 1,572 
1997 1,247 
1998 2,499 
 
 111. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110 at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 
12. 
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1999 12,273 
2000 5,180 
2001 2,019 
2002 8,685 
2003 470 
2004 644 
2005 4,483 
2006 3,650 
2007 15,109 
Total 67,148 
  
 
 
Table 3: Total Restitution 1990–2007112 
 
 
Year 
Restitution Imposed in Connection 
with Criminal Antitrust Cases ($000) 
1990 5,670 
1991 3,185 
1992 3,550 
1993 950 
1994 4,220 
1995 1,200 
1996 799 
1997 275 
1998 4,250 
1999 2,343 
2000 1,713 
 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 
12. 
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2001 31,083 
2002 7,278 
2003 15,545 
2004 18,776 
2005 10,371 
2006 2,165 
2007 4,790 
Total 118,163 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Total Incarceration 1990–2007113  
 
Year 
Incarceration: Number of Days of 
Prison Time Sentenced in Antitrust 
Division Cases 
1990 2,739 
1991 6,594 
1992 2,488 
1993 4,726 
1994 1,497 
1995 3,902 
1996 2,431 
1997 789 
1998 1,301 
1999 6,662 
2000 5,584 
 
 113. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 
13. 
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2001 4,800 
2002 10,501 
2003 9,341 
2004 7,334 
2005 13,157 
2006 5,383 
2007 31,391 
Total 
120,620 
120,620 ÷ 365.25 = 330.24 years 
 
 
Table 5: Total of Non-Prison Confinement Days (e.g., House Arrest) 
1990–2007114 
 
Year 
Number of Other Confinement Days 
Sentenced in Antitrust Division Cases 
1990 632 
1991 1,519 
1992 1,734 
1993 3,552 
1994 2,475 
1995 2,933 
1996 1,148 
1997 1,270 
1998 1,530 
1999 2,850 
2000 2,567 
 
 114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 
13. 
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2001 1,844 
2002 3,607 
2003 1,025 
2004 1,575 
2005 1,270 
2006 2,760 
2007 1,085 
Total 
35,376 
35,376 ÷ 365.25 = 96.85 years 
 
   
 
Table 6: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund115 
 
Level of Income Average Award 
Number of 
Claimants 
Total Awards 
0 $788,022.03 17 $13,396,374.59 
$24,999 or less $1,102,135.44 163 $179,648,077.33 
$25,000 – $99,999 $1,520,155.41 1,591 $2,418,567,253.96 
$100,000 – 
$199,999 
$2,302,234.80 633 $1,457,314,626.24 
$200,000 – 
$499,999 
$3,394,624.91 310 $1,052,333,721.38 
$500,000 – 
$999,999 
$4,749,654.40 89 $422,719,241.32 
 
 115. See FEINBERG REPORT, supra note 48, at 97 tbl.2. The Fund’s report provided the total 
amount of compensation for a given income bracket and the total number of claims at that income 
level. The average awards were arrived at by dividing the total awards by the number of claimants at 
that income level. Id. 
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Level of Income Average Award 
Number of 
Claimants 
Total Awards 
$1,000,000 – 
$1,999,999 
$5,671,815.64 52 $294,934,413.48 
$2,000,000 – 
$3,999,999 
$6,253,705.42 17 $106,312,992.16 
$4,000,000+ $6,379,287.70 8 $51,034,301.62 
 
 
 
Table 7: Recoveries in Private Cases116 
 
Case Recovery ($ millions) 
Airline Ticket Commission Litigation 86 
Auction Houses 
452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully 
redeemable coupons) 
Augmentin 91 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 106 
Buspirone 220 
Caldera 275 
Cardizem (direct class) 110 
Citric Acid 175 
Commercial Explosives 77 
Conwood 1,050 
DRAM 326 
 
 116. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 879, 892 tbl.1 (2008). For summaries of the 
individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits 
from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, SSRN, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523 (last modified Mar. 1, 2008) 
[hereinafter Individual Case Studies].  
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Drill Bits 53 
El Paso 
 
1,427 (plus 125 in uncounted rate 
reductions) 
Flat Glass 122 
Fructose 531 
Graphite Electrodes 47 
IBM 
775 (plus 75 in uncounted credit 
towards Microsoft software) 
Insurance 36 
Lease Oil 193 
Linerboard 202 
Lysine 65 
Microcrystalline Cellulose 50 
NASDAQ 1,027 
NCAA 74 
Netscape 750 
Paxil 165 
Platinol 50 
Polypropylene Carpet 50 
RealNetworks 478 to 761 
Relafen 250 
Remeron 75 
Rubber Chemicals 268 
Sorbates 96 
Specialty Steel 50 
Sun 700 
Taxol 66 
Terazosin 74 
Urethane 73 
Visa/MasterCard 3,383 
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Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258 
Total 18,006 to 19,639 
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Table 8: Recoveries in Cases Validated by Government Action 
 
Case 
Validation of Merits in 
Government Action 
Recovery ($ millions) 
Auction Houses Criminal Penalty 452 
Buspirone 
Part of Course of Conduct 
Resulting in FTC Consent 
Order 
220 
Cardizem 
Conduct Resulted in FTC 
Consent Order 
110 
Citric Acid Criminal Penalty 175 
Commercial Explosives Criminal Penalty 77 
DRAM Criminal Penalty 326 
Drill Bits Criminal Penalty 53 
El Paso FERC Ruling Against D 1,427 
Graphite Electrodes Criminal Penalty 47 
IBM 
Government Prevailed at 
Trial in Related Case 
775 
Lysine Criminal Penalty 65 
Microcrystalline 
Cellulose 
FTC Consent Orders 50 
Netscape v. Microsoft 
Government Prevailed at 
Trial in Related Case 
750 
Platinol 
Part of Course of Conduct 
Resulting in FTC Consent 
Order 
50 
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Polypropylene Carpet Criminal Penalty 50 
RealNetworks v. 
Microsoft 
 
EU Preliminary Findings 
Against D in Related Case 
and U.S. Government 
Prevailed at Trial in 
Somewhat Related Case 
478 to 761 
Rubber Chemicals 
 
Criminal Penalty 268 
Sorbates 
 
Criminal Penalty 96 
Specialty Steel 
 
Criminal Penalty 50 
Sun v. Microsoft 
Government Prevailed at 
Trial in Related Case 
700 
Taxol 
Part of Course of Conduct 
Resulting in FTC Consent 
Order 
66 
Terazosin 
Government Obtained 
Injunctive Relief 
74 
Urethane Criminal Penalty 73 
Vitamins Criminal Penalty 3,908 to 5,258 
Total  10,340 to 11,973 
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Table 9: Recoveries in Per Se Cases117 
 
Case Recovery ($ millions) 
Airline Ticket Commission Litigation 86 
Auction Houses 
 
452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully 
redeemable coupons) 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 106 
Cardizem (direct class) 110 
Citric Acid 175 
Commercial Explosives 77 
Conwood 1,050 
DRAM 326 
Drill Bits 53 
Flat Glass 122 
Fructose 531 
Graphite Electrodes 47 
Insurance 36 
Lease Oil 193 
Linerboard 202 
Lysine 65 
Microcrystalline Cellulose 50 
NASDAQ 1,027 
Polypropylene Carpet 50 
Rubber Chemicals 268 
Sorbates 96 
Specialty Steel 50 
Terazosin 74 
Urethane 73 
 
 117. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 913 tbl.9. 
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Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258 
Total 9,227 to 10,577 
 
Table 10: Recoveries for Cases with a Criminal Penalty as Well118 
 
Case Recovery ($ millions) 
Auction Houses 
452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully 
redeemable coupons) 
Citric Acid 175 
Commercial Explosives 77 
DRAM 326 
Drill Bits 53 
Graphite Electrodes 47 
Lysine 65 
Polypropylene Carpet 50 
Rubber Chemicals 268 
Sorbates 96 
Specialty Steel 50 
Urethane 73 
Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258 
Total 6,171 to 7,521 
 
 
Table 11: Judges Presiding Over Private Litigation by Case and 
Appointing President119 
 
Judge Case Nominated By Political Party 
 
 118. Id. at 914 tbl.11. 
 119. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (follow “Judges of the United States Courts” hyperlink, then 
search for judges by name) (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:27 PM 
315 Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement 
 361 
James Rosenbaum 
Airline Tickets 
Commission 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Lewis A. Kaplan Auction House Bill Clinton Democrat 
Henry Coke 
Morgan 
Augmentin 
George H. W. 
Bush 
Republican 
Terrell Hodges 
 
John F. Keenan 
 
Morey L. Sear 
 
 
Bruce M. Selya 
 
Julia Smith 
Gibbons 
 
D. Lowell Jensen 
 
J. Frederick Motz 
Automotive 
Refinishing 
Richard Nixon 
 
Ronald 
Reagan 
 
Gerald Ford 
 
Ronald 
Reagan 
 
Ronald 
Reagan 
 
Ronald 
Reagan 
 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
 
 
Republican 
John G. Koeltl Buspirone Bill Clinton Democrat 
Dee Benson Caldera 
George H.W. 
Bush 
Republican 
Nancy G. 
Edmunds 
Cardizem 
George H.W. 
Bush 
Republican 
Fern M. Smith Citric Acid 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
David Sam 
Commercial 
Explosives 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Thomas B. 
Russell 
Conwood Bill Clinton Democrat 
Phyllis Hamilton DRAM Bill Clinton Democrat 
John V. Singleton Drill Bits 
Lyndon B. 
Johnson 
Democrat 
Richard Haden 
(San Diego Sup. 
El Paso N/A N/A 
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Court) 
Donald Emil 
Ziegler / Donettta 
W. Ambrose 
Flat Glass 
Jimmy Carter / 
Bill Clinton 
Democrat / 
Democrat 
Michael M. Mihm Fructose 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Charles R. Weiner 
Graphite 
Electrodes 
Lyndon B. 
Johnson 
Democrat 
Colleen Kollar-
Ketelly 
IBM 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Willian W. 
Schwarzer 
Insurance Gerald Ford Republican 
Jan E. Dubois Linerboard 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Milton I. Shadur Lysine Jimmy Carter Democrat 
Thomas Newman 
O’Neill, Jr. 
Microcrystalline 
Cellulose 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Kathryn H. Vratil NCAA 
George H.W. 
Bush 
Republican 
Thomas Penfield 
Jackson 
Netscape v. 
Microsoft 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Janis Graham Jack Oil Lease Bill Clinton Democrat 
John Padova Paxil 
George H.W. 
Bush 
Republican 
Emmit G. Sullivan Platinol Bill Clinton Democrat 
Harold Murphy 
Polypropylene 
Carpet 
Jimmy Carter Democrat 
Frederick Motz 
RealNetwoks v. 
Microsoft 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Reginald C. 
Lindsay 
Relafen Bill Clinton Democrat 
Faith Hochberg Remeron Bill Clinton Democrat 
Terrell Hodges Rubber Chemicals Richard Nixon Republican 
Maxine M. 
Chesney 
Sorbates Bill Clinton Democrat 
Norman W. Black Specialty Steel Jimmy Carter Democrat 
Frederick Motz Sun v. Microsoft 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
Emmet G. Taxol Ronald Republican 
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Sullivan Reagan 
Patricia A. Seitz Terazosin Bill Clinton Democrat 
John W. 
Lungstrom 
Urethane 
George H.W. 
Bush 
Republican 
John Gleeson Visa/MasterCard Bill Clinton Democrat 
Thomas Francis 
Hogan 
Vitamins 
Ronald 
Reagan 
Republican 
  
 
 
Total 
Republicans: 27 
Total Democrats: 
18 
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Table 13: Summary of Validation of Merits in Individual Cases120 
 
Case Validation of Merits 
Airline Tickets Commission None Reported 
Auction Houses Criminal Penalty 
Augmentin 
Rulings against Ds on Underlying 
Patent Issues in Related Cases 
Automotive Refinishing None Reported 
Buspirone 
Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in 
FTC Consent Order 
Caldera Survive SJ 
Cardizem 
Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue (Aff’d 
on Appeal) and Conduct Resulted in 
FTC Consent Order 
Citric Acid Criminal Penalty 
Commercial Explosives 
Jury Verdict Against Ds by 
competitor, Criminal Penalty 
Conwood 
Jury Verdict Against D (Aff’d on 
Appeal) 
DRAM Survived SJ and Criminal Penalty 
Drill Bits Criminal Penalty 
El Paso FERC Ruling Against D 
 
 120. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *. 
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Flat Glass SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal 
Fructose SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal 
Graphite Electrodes Criminal Penalty 
IBM 
Government Prevailed at Trial in 
Related Case 
Insurance 
Dismissal Reversed in Appellate Court 
(Aff’d by USSC) 
Linerboard 
None Reported (Other than Class 
Certification) 
Lysine Criminal Penalty 
Microcrystalline Cellulose FTC Consent Orders 
NCAA 
SJ for Ps on Liability (Aff’d on 
Appeal) 
Netscape v. Microsoft 
Government Prevailed at Trial in 
Related Case 
Oil Lease None Reported 
Paxil 
 
None Reported 
Platinol 
Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in 
FTC Consent Order 
Polypropylene Carpet Criminal Penalty 
RealNetworks v. Microsoft 
 
EU Preliminary Findings Against D in 
Related Case and U.S. Government 
Prevailed at Trial in Somewhat 
Related Case 
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Relafen 
 
Ruling against D on Underlying Patent 
Issues in Related Case (Aff’d on 
Appeal) and Ps Survive Motion to 
Dismiss and for SJ and Prevail on 
Motion of Issue Preclusion Regarding 
Patent Validity 
Remeron None Reported 
Rubber Chemicals Criminal Penalty 
Sorbates Criminal Penalty 
Specialty Steel 
Criminal Penalty and Ps Survived 
Motions to Dismiss 
Sun v. Microsoft 
Government Prevailed at Trial in 
Related Case 
Taxol 
Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in 
FTC Consent Order 
Terazosin 
Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue and 
Government Obtained Injunctive 
Relief 
Urethane Criminal Penalty 
Visa/MasterCard Ps Prevailed on SJ and Defeated SJ 
Vitamins 
Criminal Penalty and Jury Verdict 
Against Non-Settling D 
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Table 14: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of the Recoveries in the Forty 
Private Cases121  
 
# Case Name 
Year/Page 
Found 
Settlement 
Amount 
(Before 
CPI/PPI) 
2010 
Dollars 
(CPI) 
1 
In re Airline Ticket 
Commission 
Litigation, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. 
LEXIS 20361 (D. 
Minn. Aug 12, 1996); 
1996-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) P71,552 
1997/pg. 9 $86.1 Million 
$117.0 
Million  
2 
In re Auction Houses 
Antitrust Litigation, 
164 F. Supp. 2d 345 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15327 (2d Cir. 2002) 
and Kruman v. 
Christie’s International 
PLC, 284 F.3d 384 
(2d Cir. 2002) 
Domestic 
Class 
(2000)/pg. 15 
Foreign Class 
(2003)/pg. 16 
 
$412 Million 
(Cash) 
(Domestic) 
 
$40 Million 
(Cash) 
(Foreign) 
(Dom) 
$521.7 
Million 
 
(For.) 
$47.4 
Million 
3 
Ryan-House et al. v. 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 
C.A. 
Doc. No. 2:02cv442 
(E.D.Va. 2004); SAJ 
Distributors, Inc. and 
Stephen L. LaFrance 
Holdings, Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., Doc. No. 
2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa 
Direct Class 
(2004)/pg. 22 
Indirect Class 
(2004)/pg. 23 
 
$62.5 Million 
(Direct) 
$29 Million 
(Indirect) 
 
(Direct) 
$72.2 
Million 
(Indir.) 
$33 
Million 
 
 
 121. All data taken from Individual Case Studies, supra note 116. Present values calculated 
using CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69. 
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filed Nov. 30, 2004) 
4 
In re Automotive 
Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litigation, 
177 F. Supp. 2d 1378 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 
2001) 
(settlements 
went on for a 
period of 5–6 
years; 
however the 
last settlement 
was 2007) 
2007/pg. 30 
$105.75 
Million 
$111.24 
Million 
5 
In re Buspirone 
Antitrust Litigation, 
185 F. Supp. 2d 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) MDL 
Doc. No. 1413, and In 
re Buspirone Patent 
Litigation, 185 F. 
Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). Final Settlement 
approval at  2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26538, 
(S.D.N.Y April 17, 
2003). (BuSpar) 
2003/pg. 38 $220 Million 
$260.7 
Million 
6 
Caldera, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., Case 
No. 2:96CV645B, 72 
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. 
Utah 1999) 
2000/pg. 43 $275 Million 
$348.2 
Million 
7 
In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litigation, 
MDL Docket No. 
1278; 105 F.Supp 2d 
682 (E.D. Mich. 2000); 
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 
2003) 
2004/pg. 54 $110 Million 
$127.0 
Million 
8 
In re Citric Acid 
Antitrust Litigation, 
MDL Docket No. 
1092; 996 F. Supp. 951 
(N.D. Cal. 1998) 
1997/pg. 58 
1998/pg. 58 
$86.2 Million 
$89 Million 
$234.1 
Million 
9 In re Commercial 1998/pg. 61 $113 Million $151.2 
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Explosives Litigation, 
945 F. Supp. 1489 (D. 
Utah 1996) 
Million 
10 
Conwood Co. v. 
United States Tobacco 
Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th 
Cir. 2002) 
Trial 2000/pg. 
70 
Appeal/ 
Trebling 
2002/ pg. 70 
$1.05 Billion 
$1.27 
Billion 
11 
In re Dynamic 
Random Access 
Memory (DRAM) 
Antitrust Litigation, 
Master File No. M-02-
1486PJH, MDL No. 
1486, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39841 (N.D. 
Cal. June 5, 2006) 
2007/pg. 75 $326 Million 
$342.9 
Million 
12 
Natural Gas Antitrust 
Cases I, II, III & IV. 
Sweetie’s, et al. v. El 
Paso Corp., No. 
319840 (S.F. Super. 
Ct. filed Mar. 20, 
2001); Continental 
Forge Company v. 
Southern California 
Gas Co., No. 
BC237336 (L.A. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 
2000); Berg v. 
Southern California 
Gas Co., No. 
BC241951 (L.A. 
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 
18, 2000); City of 
Long Beach v. 
Southern California 
Gas Co., No. 
BC247114 (L.A. 
Super. Ct. filed Mar. 
2003/pg. 82 
$551 Million 
(cash + stock) 
$876 Million 
(semi-annual 
cash) 
$653.04 
Million 
$1.038 
Billion 
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20, 2001); City of L.A. 
v. Southern California 
Gas Co., No. 
BC265905 (L.A. 
Super. Ct. filed Mar. 
20, 2001); Phillip v. El 
Paso Merchant Energy 
LP, No. GIC 759425 
(San Diego Super. Ct. 
filed Dec. 13, 2000); 
and Phillip v. El Paso 
Merchant Energy LP, 
No. GIC 759426 (San 
Diego Super. Ct. filed 
Dec. 13, 2000). (El 
Paso) 
13 
In re Flat Glass 
Antitrust Litigation, 
MDL 1200, Master 
Docket Misc. 97-0550, 
191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. 
Pa. 1999) 
2005/pg. 93 $121.7 Million 
$136.0 
Million 
14 
In re Fructose Antitrust 
Litigation, M.D.L. File 
1087, Master File # 94-
1577 (Michael Mihm) 
(C.D. Ill. 1995) 
2004/pg. 99 $531 Million 
$613 
Million 
15 
In re Graphite 
Electrodes Antitrust 
Litigation, 2003 WL 
22358491 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 9, 2003) 
2003/pg. 102 $47 Million 
$55.7 
Million 
16 IBM v. Microsoft 2005/pg. 107 
$775 Million 
(cash) 
$865.3 
Million 
17 
In re Insurance 
Antitrust Litigation, 
723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. 
Cal. 19989); rev’d, 938 
F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 
1991); aff’d sub nom 
1995/pg. 113 $36 Million 
$51.5 
Million 
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Hartford Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 
764 (1993) 
18 
In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litigation, 
MDL No. 1261, 2000 
WL 1475559, at *1–3 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000) 
(“Linerboard I” ); In re 
Linerboard Antitrust 
Litigation, 203 F.R.D. 
197, 201–04 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (“Linerboard 
II”); In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litigation, 
305 F.3d 145, 147–49 
(3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Linerboard III”); In 
re Linerboard Antitrust 
Litigation, 321 F.Supp 
2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 
2004/pg. 116 $202.5 Million 
$233.8 
Million 
19 
In re Amino Acid 
Lysine Antitrust 
Litigation, MDL No. 
1083, 918 F. Supp. 
1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
1996/pg. 121 
1997/pg 121 
(federal class 
and two 
defendants) 
$45 Million 
(major 
defendants) 
$5 Million 
(two 
defendants) 
$15 Million 
(estimate for 
state opt-out 
plaintiffs) 
$15 Million 
(federal class 
and opt-out 
payments) 
$62.5 
Million 
(Major) 
$6.8 
Million 
(Two) 
$20.4 
Million 
(state opt-
out) 
$20.4 
Million 
(federal 
class and 
opt-out) 
 
20 
In re Microcrystalline 
Cellulose Antitrust 
Litigation, MDL No 
2005/pg. 128 
2003/pg. 129 
$25 Million 
$25 Million 
$27.9 
Million 
$29.6 
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1402, 221 F.R.D. 428 
(E.D. Pa. 2004) 
Million 
21 
In re NASDAQ 
Market-Makers 
Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. No, 1023, No. 
94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
1998/pg. 133 $1.027 Billion 
$1.374 
Billion 
22 
Law v. National 
Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n., 902 F. Supp. 
1394 (D.Kan. 1995); 
aff’d, 134 F. 3d 1010 
(10th Cir. 1998); 
rev’d, 938 F.2d 919 
(9th Cir. 1991) 
 
2000/pg. 139 $74.5 Million 
$94.3 
Million 
23 
North Shore 
Hematology & 
Oncology Associates 
v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., Civil 
Action 
No.1:04cv248(EGS) 
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 13, 
2004) (Platinol) 
2004/pg. 140 $50 Million 
$57.7 
Million 
24 
In re Lease Oil 
Antitrust Litigation 
(No. II), 186 F.R.D. 
403 (S.D. Tex. 1999), 
142 Oil & Gas Rep. 
532 (1999) 
1999/pg. 144 $193.5 Million 
$253.3 
Million 
25 
Netscape Comm. Corp. 
v. Microsoft Corp., Per 
Local Civil Rule 40.5, 
Related to Civil Action 
Nos. 98-1232 and 98-
1233 (D.D.C. 
2002)(a/k/a AOL v. 
Microsoft) 
2003/pg. 152 $750 Million 
$888.8 
Million 
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26 
Oncology & Radiation 
Associates v. Bristol-
Meyers Squibb Co., 
Case No. 
1:04CV00248 (D.D.C.) 
(Taxol) 
2003/pg. 158 $65.8 Million 
$78.0 
Million 
27 
Stop N Shop 
Supermarket 
Company, et al. v. 
Smithkline Beecham 
Corp. Civil Action No. 
03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. 
filed Aug. 6, 2003), 
and; 
Nichols v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., No. 
00-CV-6222 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan 23, 2003) (Paxil) 
2005/pg. 163, 
165 
$165 Million 
$184.2 
Million 
28 
In re Polypropylene 
Carpet Antitrust 
Litigation, 93 F. Supp. 
2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 
2000) 
2001/pg. 171 $49.7 Million 
$61.2 
Million 
29 
RealNetworks, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., Civil 
Action No. JFM-04-
968, MDL Docket No. 
1332 (D. Md.) (2005 
settlement) 
2005/pg. 175 
$478–$761 
Million 
$533.7–
$849.7 
Million 
30 
Red Eagle Resources, 
et al. v. Baker Hughes 
Inc., et al., 
No.4:91cv00627 
(Docket) (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 11, 1991) (In re 
Drill Bits Antitrust 
Litigation) 
1993/pg. 181 
1994/pg. 181 
$45.4 Million  
$8 Million 
$68.5 
Million 
$11.7 
Million 
31 
In re Relafen Antitrust 
Litigation, Civil Action 
No. 01-12239-WGY; 
2004/pg. 188, 
Indirect 2005 
pg. 190–91 
$175 Million 
(Direct) 
$75 Million 
$202.0 
Million 
$83.7 
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346 F. Supp. 2d 349 
(D. Mass. 2004); 231 
F.R.D. 52 (D. Mass. 
2005) 
 (Indirect) Million 
32 
In re Remeron 
Antitrust Litigation, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27013 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 
2005) 
2005/pg. 194 $75 Million 
$83.7 
Million 
33 
In re Rubber 
Chemicals Antitrust 
Litigation, 350 
F.Supp.2d 1366 
(J.P.M.L. 2004), 2005-
1 Trade Cases P 
74,804 (J.P.M.L.2004) 
(No. MDL 1648) 
2005/pg. 202, 
Bayer 
2006/pg. 202, 
Flexsys 
$250.4 Million 
(Bayer) 
$18.5 Million 
(Flexsys) 
$279.6 
Million 
$20 
Million 
34 
In re Sorbates Direct 
Purchaser Antitrust 
Litigation, 2002 WL 
31655191 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 15, 2002) 
2002/pg. 207 
 
$96.5 Million 
$117 
Million 
35 
Sun Microsystems v. 
Microsoft, 333 F.3d 
517 (4th Cir. 2003) 
2004/pg. 211 $700 Million 
$808 
Million 
36 
In re Terazosin 
Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litigation 
Case No. 
99-MDL-1317-
Seitz/Klein, a/k/a 
Louisiana Wholesale 
Drug Co., Inc. v. 
Abbot Laboratories, et 
al. S.D. Fla. Case no. 
98-3125, 352 F. Supp. 
2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 
2005) and Valley Drug 
Co. v. Abbot 
Laboratories, et al., 
2002/pg. 213 $74.5 Million 
$90.3 
Million 
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S.D. Fla. 
Case No. 99-7143 
37 
Transamerican 
Refining Corp. v. 
Dravo Corp., et al., No. 
4:88CV00789 
(Docket) (S.D.Tex. 
Mar. 10, 1988) 
(Specialty Steel 
Piping Antitrust 
Litigation) (1992 
settlement) 
1992/pg. 221 $50 Million 
$77.7 
Million 
38 
In re Urethane 
Antitrust Litigation, 
MDL No. 1616, 232 
F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan. 
2005) 
2006/pg. 228 
$73.3 Million 
(Chemical 1 
$18M) 
(Chemical 2 
$55.3) 
$79.3 
Million 
39 
In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney 
Antitrust Litigation, 
a/k/a Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. et. al v. Visa 
U.S.A. Inc. and 
MasterCard 
International Inc., 396 
F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 
2005) 
2003/pg. 233 $3.383 Billion 
$4.009 
Billion 
40 
In re Vitamins 
Antitrust Litigation 
(many related cases) 
2003/pg. 242 
(conservative 
average of 
settlement 
dates) 
 
$4.2-$5.6 
Billion  
$4.977–
$6.636 
Billion  
 Total 
In 2010 
Dollars 
$21.887–$23.862 Billion 
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Table 15: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of Sanctions Imposed from 
1990–2007 
 
# Year 
Sanction122 Amounts 
Before CPI ($000) 
2010 Dollars 
(CPI123)($000) 
1 1990 31,079 51,942 
2 1991 29,176 46,793 
3 1992 29,805 46,405 
4 1993 46,981 71,021 
5 1994 46,936 69,181 
6 1995 45,055 64,579 
7 1996 30,760 42,825 
8 1997 207,947 283,014 
9 1998 253,392 339,575 
10 1999 999,028 1,309,884 
11 2000 320,494 406,553 
12 2001 307,918 379,793 
13 2002 127,159 154,400 
14 2003 80,707 95,813 
15 2004 161,244 186,458 
16 2005 619,786 693,218 
17 2006 482,920 523,257 
18 2007 665,788 701,421 
Totals 4,486,175 5,466,132 
 
 
 
 122. All data taken from Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from 
Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693 (last revised September 9, 2010). These 
figures represent the combined totals of corporate antitrust fines, individual antitrust fines, and 
restitution from 1990-2007. The individual antitrust fines were tripled. For explanation, see 
Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust 
Laws, Section IV. 
 123. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69. 
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APPENDIX II: TABLE A AND ACCOMPANYING NOTES 
Table A: Monetary Valuation of Prison Time Established Through False 
Imprisonment Litigation.  
 
Plaintiff Sentence Total Award Award per year 
How 
Finalized? 
Raul Ramirez 10 months 
$9,000,000.00 
(settlement) 
$10,800,000.00 
Phone 
interview 
George Jones 1 month $355,500.00 $4,266,000.00 
Phone 
interview 
Kerry Edwards 30 days 
$327,500.00 
(settlement) 
$3,875,416.66 
Phone 
interview 
Mark Diaz 
Bravo 
 
1,179 days $3,758,976.90 $1,164,517.36 
Phone 
interview 
James 
Newsome 
 
15 years $15,000,000.00 $1,000,000.00 
Phone 
interview 
Stephan 
Cowans 
6.5 years 
$3,200,000.00 
(settlement) 
$492,307.69 
Published 
case 
Ellen Maria 
Reasonover 
16 years 
$7,500,000.00 
(settlement) 
$468,750.00 
Published 
case 
Eddie Joe 
Lloyd 
17 years 
$6,000,000.00 
(settlement) 
$352,941.17 
Published 
case 
Neil Miller 10.5 years 
$3,200,000.00 
(settlement) 
$304,761.91 
Published 
case 
Larry Mayes 21 years 
$4,500,000.00 
(settlement) 
 
$214,285.72 
Published 
case 
Eduardo 
Velázquez 
14 years 
$ 2,450,000.00 
(settlement) 
$175,000.00 
Published 
case 
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Bruce 
Godschalk 
15 years 
$2,340,000.00 
(settlements) 
$156,000.00 
Published 
case 
Clarence 
Elkins 
 
7 years 
$ 1,075,000.00 
(settlement) 
$153,571.43 
Published 
case 
Olmedo 
Hidalgo 
14 years 
$2,000,000.00 
(settlement) 
$142,857.15 
Published 
case 
Kerry Kotler 
10 years 8 
months 
$1510000.00 $141,563.39 
Published 
case 
Robinson 14 years 
$1,750,000.00 
(settlement) 
$125,000.00 
Published 
case 
Michael Green 13 years 
$16,00,000.00 
(settlement) 
$123,076.92 
Published 
case 
Darryl Hunt 19.5 years 
$ 1,958,454.00 
(settlement) 
$100,433.54 
Published 
case 
Stephen Avery 17 years 
$400,000.00 
(settlement) 
$23,529.41 
Published 
case 
 
Notes for Table A—Following is a list of cases included in Table A. 
This contains the researcher’s methodology notes and other general case 
notes.  
1. Raul Ramirez.124 The verdict in this case was $18 million dollars, 
but it settled for $9 million.125 Ramirez was a twenty-five-year-old 
special education teacher.126 Eight months after the attempted rape of a 
sixteen-year-old girl, the police arrested Raul Ramirez, who spent ten 
months incarcerated awaiting trial.127 He was found factually innocent 
and sued for false arrest and malicious prosecution.128 This case was 
cited in Limone v. United States as one of several cases in recent years 
where courts have awarded compensation of more than $1,000,000.00 
per year of wrongful incarceration.129 
 
 124. Telephone Interview with Mark Artan, attorney for Plaintiff Raul Ramirez (Oct. 28, 
2009). This case settled in early 2006. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 127. See id. at 1212.  
 128. See id. 
 129. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’’d, 579 F.3d 
79 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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2. George Jones.130 The defendant fully satisfied this judgment.131 
We include only the false imprisonment portion of $355,500 and exclude 
the $71,100 for false arrest, $71,100 for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, $213,300 for malicious prosecution, $90,000 in 
punitive damages,132 and $271,188.75 in attorneys’ fees.133 The police 
failed to turn over exculpatory evidence in a rape and murder case 
against George Jones, who was a high school student at the time of 
arrest.134 This case was found via a citation by the district court in 
Limone.135 
3. Kerry Edwards.136 The settlement is ambiguous as to the portion 
of the award pertaining to false imprisonment and the portion of the 
award pertaining to civil rights violations.137 Kerry Edwards was 
misidentified as the subject of an arrest warrant and held for thirty 
days.138 At Edwards’s insistence, an independent investigator wrote a 
report within three days confirming that Edwards had been misidentified. 
However, the report was ignored for several weeks while Edwards 
continued to be incarcerated.139 This verdict summary was found by 
running a Westlaw verdict search.140 
4. Mark Diaz Bravo.141 This award was satisfied by the 
defendant.142 The total award of $3,758,976 was calculated by taking the 
$3,000.00 per day awarded by the court for 1,179 days in prison and 
 
 130. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 131. Telephone Interview with John L. Stainthorp, attorney for Plaintiff George Jones, 
People’s Law Office (Oct. 8, 2009). 
 132. Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83 C 2430, 1987 WL 19800, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 
1987). 
 133. Id. at *4. 
 134. Jones, 856 F.2d at 988–89. 
 135. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 244 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d 79 
(1st Cir. 2009). 
 136. Edwards v. Freehold Twp., No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2006 WL 4587710 (D.N.J. 
2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 137. See Complaint at, Edwards, No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2007 WL 3388973 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 2, 2007). 
 138. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Mallon, Attorney for Kerry Edwards, Law Offices 
of Thomas J. Mallon (Aug. 3, 2009).  
 139. Id.  
 140. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 141. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002). 
 142. Telephone Interview with Tonia Ibanez, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Oct. 9, 2009). 
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adding the court’s $221,976.00 award for lost earnings.143 An award of 
$1,000,000 for time spent in prison before conviction was not included in 
our calculations.144 Mark Diaz Bravo was a nurse falsely convicted of 
raping a patient.145 This case was cited by the Limone case.146 
5. James Newsome.147 The award was fully satisfied.148 In addition 
to $1,000,000 per year of imprisonment, the jury awarded $850,000 total 
in attorneys’ fees, which we did not include in our calculations.149 The 
jury found that officers violated Newsome’s civil rights by inducing 
three witnesses to falsely testify against him.150 James Newsome was an 
unemployed paralegal at the time of arrest. However, although he 
testified that he was still employed, the court held that this did not 
require a new trial.151 This case was cited by the Limone case.152 
6. Stephen Cowans.153  Although Cowans only served 6.5 years, he 
was sentenced to 35–50 years for murder, which was a factor in the 
amount of the settlement.154 The Boston police department used faulty 
finger printing techniques as evidence at plaintiff’s trial. Plaintiff was 
released as a result of DNA testing released by the New England 
Innocence Project in January 2004. That same year, Boston’s finger 
printing department was closed for two years. It reopened in 2006 after 
heavy audits of its internal procedures.155 This verdict summary was 
found through a Westlaw verdict search.156 
 
 143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 144. See id.  
 145. See Bravo, 2002 WL 31547001, at *1. 
 146. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d 
79 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 147. Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 148. Telephone Interview with Sean Gallagher, Attorney for Plaintiff, Bartlit, Beck, Herman, 
Palenchar & Scott (Oct. 9, 2009). 
 149. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303. 
 150. See id. at 302.  
 151. Id. at 307. 
 152. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d 
79, 106 (1st Cir. 2009) 
 153. Cowans v. City of Boston, No. 1:05-CV-11574-RGS, 2006 WL 4286744 (D. Mass. Aug. 
4, 2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id.  
 156. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
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7. Ellen Maria Reasonover.157 Reasonover was falsely convicted of 
murder at an unfair trial where hearsay evidence was allowed. Her 
conviction was overturned, and she settled her case with the city. Found 
through a Westlaw verdict search.158  
8. Eddie Joe Lloyd.159 Lloyd was exonerated by DNA evidence of 
the rape and murder of a sixteen-year-old girl.160 This settlement 
summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.161 
9. Neil Miller.162 Miller was exonerated by DNA evidence.163 This 
verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.164 
10. Larry Mayes.165 Originally, a jury verdict of $9,000,000 was 
reached, but was appealed by Defendant. The Seventh Circuit stayed its 
judgment on appeal to allow the parties to settle the case for 
$4,500,000.166 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw 
verdict search.167 
11. Eduardo Velázquez.168 Prior to this action, Eduardo Velazquez 
had filed and settled a lawsuit under Massachusetts’ exoneration 
statute169 for the statutory maximum of $500,000.170 The police failed to 
 
 157. Reasonover v. City of Dellwood, No. 4:01-cv-01210-CEJ, 1000 WL 81189 (E.D. Mo. no 
date given) (Jury Verdict Reports settlement summary). 
 158. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 159. Lloyd v. City of Detroit, No. 2:04-CV-70922-GER-SDP, 2006 WL 2062011 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 1, 2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 160. See id.  
 161. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 162. Miller v. Boston, No. 1:03CV10805JLT, 2006 WL 4111728 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2006) 
(Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 163. See id.  
 164. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment” 
“wrongful confinement” “false imprisonment” “malicious prosecution” “wrongful arrest” on June 1, 
2009. 
 165. Mayes v. City of Hammond, No. 2:03-CV-379-PRC, 2008 WL 3874685 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 
15, 2008). 
 166. Mayes v. City of Hammond, 290 Fed. App’x 945, 946 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008).  
 167. Database: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” “wrongful 
confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on June 1, 
2009. 
 168. Velázquez v. City of Chicopee, 226 F.R.D. 31 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 169. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, §§ 1–9 (2006). 
 170. Velázquez v. City of Chicopee, 3:03-CV-30249-MAP, 2005 WL 3839494 (D. Mass. 
2005) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
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disclose exonerating evidence.171 This settlement summary was found by 
running a Westlaw verdict search.172 
12. Bruce Godschalk.173 Godschalk was a twenty-six-year-old 
landscaper at the time of conviction.174 This case was cited in a footnote 
in a law review article.175 
13. Clarence Elkins.176 Elkins was exonerated by DNA testing.177 
This verdict summary was found by performing a Westlaw verdict 
search.178 
14. Olmedo Hidalgo.179 Hidalgo was convicted of murder despite 
what he claimed to be overwhelming evidence of his innocence that was 
withheld.180 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw 
verdict search.181 
15. Kerry Kotler.182 Kotler, who had been convicted of rape, was 
exonerated by DNA evidence.183
 
Kotler sued for unjust conviction and 
imprisonment under the state statute.184 This case was cited in a footnote 
in a law review article.185 
 
 171. Velázquez, 226 F.R.D. at 32–33. 
 172. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 173. Godschalk v. Montgomery Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 02-6745, 2003 WL 
22998364 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary) (discussing $740,000 
settlement with the district attorney’s office); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Wrongful Error, and 
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 43 n.30 (discussing both the aforementioned 
settlement and a $1,600,000 settlement with the township). 
 174. See Godschalk, 2003 WL 22998364. 
 175. Garrett, supra note 173, at 43 n.30.  
 176. Elkins v. Ohio, No. CR-98-06041, 2006 WL 3827191 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2006) (Verdict 
Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 177. See id. 
 178. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 179. Hidalgo v. City of New York, No. 06 CIV. 13118, 2009 WL 1199430 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary). 
 180. See id.  
 181. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 182. Kotler v. State, 680 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
 183. See id. at 587. 
 184. See N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8-b (McKinney 2007). There is no statutory maximum 
on the amount of an award under this statute. See § 8-b 6. 
 185. Garrett, supra note 173, at 44 n.32.  
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16. Robinson.186 Plaintiff alleged failure to properly train and hire 
officers and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.187 This settlement 
summary was found by performing a Westlaw search.188 
17. Michael Green.189 Plaintiff was exonerated of rape via DNA 
evidence190 because an analysis of a rag said to contain Plaintiff’s semen 
had been fabricated. 191 As part of the settlement, the city agreed to 
reopen the more than one hundred cases in which the lab technician had 
testified.192 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw 
verdict search.193  
18. Darryl Hunt.194 Plaintiff was exonerated through DNA evidence 
and a confession by another inmate.195 This settlement summary was 
found by running a Westlaw verdict search.196 
19. Stephen Avery.197 Avery was exonerated by DNA evidence.198 
Avery’s case probably settled very low because he was accused of a 
second murder before this case settled.199 The verdict summary was 
found by running a Westlaw verdict search.200 
 
 
 186. Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, JVR No. 491391, 2007 WL 5476226 (S.D. Cal. 2008) 
(LRP Publications settlement summary). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 189. Green v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:03-CV-00906, 2004 WL 1574178 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 
2004) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment” 
“wrongful confinement” “false imprisonment” “malicious prosecution” “wrongful arrest” on June 1, 
2009. 
 194. Hunt. v. North Carolina, JAS NC Ref. No. 231251 WL, 2007 WL 2791826 (N.C. Super. 
Feb. 16, 2007) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary). 
 195. See id.  
 196. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
 197. Avery v. Manitowoc Co., No. 04-C986, 2006 WL 3955911 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (Law 
Bulletin Publishing Co. settlement summary). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id.  
 200. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” 
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on 
June 1, 2009. 
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APPENDIX III  
Following is a list of the forty cases included in this Study and the 
researchers who analyzed them.201 
1. In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20361 
(D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1996). Tara Shoemaker. 
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327 (2d Cir. July 30, 
2002); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Douglas Richards. 
3. Ryan-House v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33711 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2005); SAJ Distribs., Inc., v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., No. 2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 30, 2004) 
(Augmentin). Michael Einhorn. 
4. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 2d 
1378 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Maarten Burggraaf & Andrew Sullivan. 
5. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), final settlement approval, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26538 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2003). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom. 
6. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 
1999). Tara Shoemaker & Erica Dahlstrom. 
7. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). Morgan Anderson. 
8. In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 
1998). Bobby Gordon. 
9. In re Commercial Explosives Litig., 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Utah 
1996). Ruthie Linzer. 
10. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
Erika Dahlstrom. 
11. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 
Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006). Erika 
Dahlstrom. 
12. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV: Sweetie’s v. El Paso 
Corp., No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Cont’l Forge 
Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC237336 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 25, 
 
 201. For complete case analyses, see ROBERT H. LANDE & JOSHUA P. DAVIS, BENEFITS FROM 
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF FORTY CASES (2007), available at 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10990. 
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2000); Berg v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC241951 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed 
Dec. 18, 2000); City of Long Beach v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC247114 
(L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); City of L.A. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 
No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Phillip v. El Paso 
Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC 759425 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13, 
2000); Phillip v. El Paso Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego 
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13, 2000) (El Paso). Erin Bennett & Polina 
Melamed.  
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1999). 
Richard Kilsheimer. 
14. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp. 
530 (C.D. Ill. 1996). Michael Freed. 
15. In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 22358491 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2003). Norman Hawker. 
16. Scott Brooks, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues, IBM, 
July 1, 2005 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/ pressrelease/7767.wss. 
Erika Dahlstrom. 
17. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), 
rev’d, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d sub nom, Hartford Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Maarten Burggraaf. 
18. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard I), No. 1261, 2000 
WL 1475559, at *1–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000); In re Linerboard Antitrust 
Litig. (Linerboard II), 203 F.R.D. 197, 201–04 (E.D.Pa. 2001), aff’d, In 
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard III), 305 F.3d 145, 147–49 (3d 
Cir. 2002); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. 
Pa. 2004). Maarten Burggraaf.  
19. In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 
(N.D. Ill. 1996). Maarten Burggraaf. 
20. In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428 
(E.D. Pa. 2004). Michael Einhorn. 
21. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F. Supp. 
703 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Maarten Burggraaf. 
22. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. 
Kan. 1995), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). Joey Pulver. 
23. Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action Nos. 98-
1232, 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2002). Andrew Smullian. 
24. N. Shore Hematology & Oncology Assocs. v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 04 cv248 (EGS) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 13, 
2004). Tara Shoemaker. 
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25. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
Stratis Camatsos. 
26. Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 266 F. Supp. 
2d 44 (D.D.C. 2003). Tara Shoemaker. 
27. Stop & Shop Supermarket Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 6, 2003); Nichols v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2003). 
Tara Shoemaker. 
28. In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348 
(N.D. Ga. 2000). Drew Stevens. 
29. Settlement Agreement, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
No. JFM-04-968, M.D.L. Docket No. 1332 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2005). 
Norman Hawker. 
30. Red Eagle Res. v. Baker Hughes Inc. (In re Drill Bits Antitrust 
Litig.), No. 4:91cv00627 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 11, 1991). Ruthie Linzer.  
31. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 
2004). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom. 
32. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013 
(D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom. 
33. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1366 
(J.P.M.L.). Ruthie Linzer. 
34. In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2002 WL 
31655191 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002). Joey Pulver. 
35. Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2003). 
Robert Lande. 
36. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 
1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom. 
37. Settlement Agreement, Transam. Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 
No. 4:88CV00789 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 1988) (Specialty Steel 
Piping Antitrust Litigation). Ruthie Linzer. 
38. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan. 2005). 
Bobby Gordon. 
39. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. & MasterCard Int’l 
Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005). Robert Lande. 
40. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. (many related cases), see John M. 
Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Cartel, (April 9, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885968.  
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